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ABSTRACT 
PERCEPTIONS OF THE EFFECTS OF FREER-TRADE BETWEEN 
U.S. AND CANADA ON CORPORATE STRATEGIES: 
A SURVEY OF PRESIDENTS OF THE TOP 300 
CANADIAN INDUSTRIAL FIRMS 
MAY 1988 
HOWARD S. TU, B.A., NORTHWEST NAZARENE COLLEGE 
M.B.A., BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Directed by: Professor A. Elliott Carlisle 
The purpose of this study is to understand how 
business executives perceive the effects of freer trade 
and the effects of such a perception on the implementa¬ 
tion of their strategies. 
Many economists argue that free trade will lead to 
market expansion which in turn results in trade efficien¬ 
cy, production efficiency, and investment efficiency. 
This study used this argument to analyze executives’ 
perceptions as to the impacts of freer trade and its 
likely effects on the implementation of their strategies. 
Perception of executives in the top 300 Canadian 
industrial firms as to the effects of freer trade between 
the U.S. and Canada was sought in an effort to discover 
whether they confirm with the economists’ logic. By 
analyzing the variables which are the underlying causes 
of the efficiencies resulting from market expansion and 
by finding out the effects of such variables on the 
development and implementation of corporate strategies, 
vi 
we will be able to examine CEO’s perception as to freer 
trade and it effects. 
We find that a majority of the executives perceived 
that freer trade between U.S. and Canada will certainly 
lead to positive results on the sixteen selected outcomes 
which are indicators of demand in the market and 
efficiency in trade, production and investment. The 
percentage of executives who believe that such outcomes 
will lead to a change of their implementation of 
strategies is approximately 60%. This percentage is 
quite high considering that a high percentage of the 
U.S.-Canadian business is enjoying some degree of freedom 
from trade barriers even before the free trade 
negotiations. 
Our findings also support the economists’ argument 
and the hypothesis that manager’s decisions in choosing 
the tactics to implement their strategies are influenced 
by their perception of the trade policy. 
Combining the above findings, we may conclude that, 
despite different view points, the executives perceive 
freer trade between the United States and Canada will 
lead to an expansion of consumption which in turn will 
lead to the improvement of efficiency in trade, 
production, and investment. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Overview 
The purpose of this study is to understand how 
business executives perceive the effects of lessened 
trade barriers and how such perceptions are likely to 
affect the formulation and implementation of corporate 
strategies. 
How senior executives perceive and act upon their 
firms’ external environments plays a large role in 
corporate conduct and performance (Bourgeois, 1985). 
Strategic management and organization theory provide two 
academic perspectives on how this performance is achieved 
(Bourgeois & Astley, 1979). A central tenet in strategic 
management is that a match between environmental 
condition and organizational capabilities and resources 
is critical to performance (Chandler, 1962; Bourgeois 
1985), and that the strategist’s job is to find and 
optimize this match. Organization theory literature has 
advanced a strikingly similar match or fit notion in the 
cent ingeney theory paradigm. Burns and Stalker (1961) 
and Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) suggest that effectiveness 
derives from structuring an administrative arrangement 
appropriate to an organization’s external environment. 
Literature in strategic management has noted the 
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importance of perception in decision making (Mintzberg, 
Raisinghani, and Theoret, 1976; Lyles and Mitroff, 1980; 
Mason and Mitroff, 1981; Kiesler and Sproull, 1982; 
Bourgeois, 1985; Duhaime and Schwenk, 1985). It is 
logical to assume that managers’ perceptions of the 
environment play an important role in determining the 
strategies of the firms. 
Employing the above assumptions, the present study 
examines the effect of perception of the environment on 
the formulation and implementation of corporate 
strategies from the perspective of the presidents of the 
top 300 Canadian industrial firms. 
Background 
Free trade as defined in economics is trade 
unfettered by government-imposed trade restrictions. 
This state is unlikely ever to be achieved between two 
sovereign countries (MacDonald, 1985). Many economists 
argue that free trade will lead to an expansion of the 
market, which in turn will lead to production efficiency, 
investment efficiency, and trade efficiency (Ricardo, 
1817; Grubel, 1981; MacDonald, 1985). This argument has 
been used extensively in both the Bladen Report (1961) 
and the MacDonald Commission Report (1985) in presenting 
their cases for freer trade between the U.S. and Canada. 
Since production efficiency, investment efficiency, 
and trade efficiency are deciding factors in long term 
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investments in plants, technology, and human resources, 
they should have an important impact on the 
implementation of corporate strategy. From the 
economists’ view, as two countries reach a free trade or, 
more accurately, a freer trade agreement, more inter¬ 
dependence will occur and there will be reconstruction or 
reorganization of the economic structures in both 
countries (Jones, 1979; Shutt, 1985). From a strategic 
management perspective, managers must develop and 
implement action plans to improve their organizations’ 
business portfolio and enhance long-term performance 
(Odiorne, 1974). During a time of change, the managers 
must anticipate any change between task-environment and 
restructure the organization to achieve a satisfactory 
organizational-environmental fit (Terreberry, 1976; 
Quinn, 1980; Joele, 1982). Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and 
Theoret (1976), Lyles and Mitroff (1980), Mason and 
Mitroff (1981), and Duhaime and Schwenk (1985), among 
others, have demonstrated the importance of perception in 
the manager’s decision making process. Therefore, it may 
be argued that the manager’s perception of the 
consequences of freer trade will have an effect on the 
development and implementation of action plans which 
contribute to the corporate strategy. 
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Research Setting and Questions 
Negotiations between the U.S. and Canada are 
proceeding towards a new trade agreement and freer trade 
is very much in the minds of managers in both countries. 
A survey was mailed to Canadian executieves on the 6th of 
July, 1987 and a follow-up was sent one month later. 
With a negotiation deadline set for October 4, 1987 and 
with frequent news coverage of the negotiations, the 
public awareness of the trade barrier problems is at its 
peak. 
Since the conditions of free trade have never been 
achieved and their ideal effects exist only in theory, 
how do business executives expect to cope with the 
problems of trade barriers? How do they intend to 
incorporate government trade policy into their 
implementation of their corporate strategies? Do their 
perceptions of the effects of freer trade agree with the 
economists’ arguments? What effect is the agreement or 
disagreement with such arguments likely to have on 
corporate strategies? 
Objectives 
The effects of perception on behavior have long been 
recognized in the fields of psychology and communication. 
In the field of business, a major effort in marketing 
research has been concentrated in the study of the 
relationship between the attitudes and actions of 
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consumers. In strategic management, the importance of 
perception for decision making has also been noted by 
several authors (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret, 
1976; Lyles and Mitroff, 1980; Mason and Mitroff, 1981; 
Duhaime and Schwenk, 1985). 
As a relatively new academic field whose foundations 
are practical rather then theoretical, strategic 
management has produced very little hypothesis-testing 
research. Although the number of investigation is 
growing, theoretical formulations derived from these 
investigation are still wanting (Bourgeois, 1985). The 
primary objective of this study is to contribute to an 
understanding of how perceptions of changes in the terms 
of trade are likely to affect strategic decisions by top 
executives, 
In today’s global economic, it is almost impossible 
for a large firm to restrict its business within its 
domestic boundaries and to disregard the rest of the 
world. This study does not argue for or against trade 
barriers, but attempts to find out how executives 
perceive the effects of a regulation of trade barriers 
will have on their strategic decisions and how they 
expect to deal with the resulting changes in their 
operations. Such findings will be helpful both to firms 
that are new to international business and to policy 
makers in the international trade arena. This study’s 
secondary objectives are to address the following issues: 
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Conceptual: 
1) To empirically examine propositions made by the 
economists with regard to strategic management 
decisions. 
2) To try to link the effects of such propositions 
to corporate executive policy making. 
Pragmatic: 
1) To determine how business executives expect to 
cope with freer trade, especially, in 
anticipation of free trade; and to examine 
the effects of freer trade on corporate strategy 
and its implementation. 
2) To help corporate executives define and pursue 
their role in the formulation of trade policy. 
Subsequent Chapters 
Chapter II discusses theory and literature related 
to executive perceptions of the environment, strategy 
formulation and implementation, and the relationship 
between the three. In the study of the alignment of the 
organization and its environment, one school suggests 
that organizations should adapt to the external 
environment, and a second school sees the "enactment" of 
environment through social interaction (Weick, 1979; 
Morgan, 1980; Smircich and Stubbart, 1983). Chapter III 
discusses the role of managers in the formulation of 
public policies and the legitimacy of such involvement. 
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Chapter IV takes a look at trade from the economists view 
point. Our discussion covers the classic economic 
theories, pure trade theories, and protectionism. 
Chapter V provides some backgorund on the trade 
relationship between the U.S. and Canada. Chapter VI 
develops the research theorems, hypotheses and 
methodology used in this study. Chapter VII presents the 
results of the data analysis and a discussion of those 
results. Chapter VIII contains a summary and conclusion 
section which provides a synopsis of the value of this 
research and suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER II 
STRATEGY, IMPLEMENTATION, AND PERCEPTION 
Introduction 
During the last decade, a body of literature has 
emerged on the meaning of strategy, on how to formulate a 
strategic plan, and on the process of aligning the 
internal organization to fit the needs of strategy 
(Thompson and Strickland, 1983). Today, the conceptual 
aspects of strategic planning seem to be better 
developed, while the implementation aspects might be seen 
as the weakest elements (Lorange, 1982). There appears 
to be no unified, logical, normative approach to the 
implementation of strategy. Hrebiniak and Joyce (1984) 
believe that much more has been written about strategy 
implementation than is apparent from a survey of titles 
of books and articles in academic and professional 
journals. Most of what we do know is fragmented and 
hidden among several fields of organization and 
management study. The first part of this chapter will 
outline the concepts and processes of corporate strategy 
and then review the literature on its implementation. 
The second part of this chapter will outline different 
definitions of perception and discuss the relationship 
between perception, attitude, belief and their effect on 
the formulation and implementation of strategy. 
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Strategy 
The Concept of Strategy 
Since the term "strategy" is borrowed from the 
military, there is no conceptual consensus about strategy 
among authors in the field of management (Schendel and 
Hofer, 1979; Bracker, 1980; Mintzberg, 1981; Evered, 
1983). Hofer and Schendel (1978) compare different 
authors’ concepts of strategy. They find that among the 
authors there are major disagreements in three primary 
areas: 1) the breadth of the concept of strategy; 2) the 
components of strategy, if any ; and 3) the inclusiveness 
of the strategy-formulation process. 
Strategy Defined. Until the early 1960’s, the 
basic concept of the business policy area was still that 
of policy formulation. In the early 1960s, policy 
formulation proved increasingly unable to deal with the 
increase in size and complexity of organizations. 
Chandler's (1962) research marks the beginning of 
interest in the concept of strategy in academia. He 
defines strategy as 
the determination of the basic long-term 
goals and objectives of an enterprise, and 
the adoption of courses of action and the 
allocation of resources necessary for 
carrying out these goals. (1962, p. 13) 
This definition of strategy emphasizes both 
formation of goals and objectives and of action plans and 
resource commitments utilized to achieve these ends. 
Chandler talks more about the process for formulating the 
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strategy than about the content of the strategy itself. 
Also missing from Chandler’s definition is the notion 
that strategy describes the essential linkage between the 
firm and its environment (Schendel and Hofer, 1979). 
Kenneth Andrews (1980) offers another view of the 
concept of strategy. Andrews defines strategy as 
the pattern of decisions in a company that 
determines and reveals its objectives, 
purposes or goals, produces the principal 
policies and plans for achieving those goals, 
and defines the range of business the company 
is to pursue, the kind of economic and human 
organization it is or intends to be, and the 
nature of the economic and non-economic 
contribution it intends to make to its 
shareholders, employees, customers and 
communities. (1980, p. 13) 
This definition highlights the interconnection of 
purposes, policies and organization; the interdependence 
of the formulation and implementation of corporate 
purpose; and the internal consistency of a firm’s choices 
of identity, position and character on the one hand and 
its actions on the other. Andrews’ definition is 
concerned more with managerial practice, and it reveals 
an interest for the practitioner. It is also more 
concerned with economic opportunities and threats. 
Peter Drucker (1973) deals with strategy from a 
completely different view point. He defines strategy as 
objectives which deals with the resources a company needs 
to be able to perform, with their supply, their 
utilization, and their productivity. Management has to 
anticipate the future, to attempt to mold it, and to 
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balance short-range and long range goal. He is mainly 
concerned with how managers can achieve these objectives. 
Drucker looks at long range planning as largely makes up 
by short-run decisions and the present and immediate 
short range require strategy fully as much as long range. 
Schendel and Hofer (1979) feel that these earlier 
definitions of strategy are incomplete on several counts. 
First, they did not distinguish between corporate-level 
and business-level strategy. Second, the relationship 
between policies in integrating functional areas and the 
firm with its environment across several organization 
levels in addition to its functional areas was not made 
clear. Schendel and Hofer (1979) develop a composite 
definition of strategy built around four components: 1) 
scope, which may be defined in terms of product/market 
matches and geographic territories; 2) resource 
deployments and distinctive competencies; 3) competitive 
advantage; and 4) synergy; and three organizational 
levels: 1) corporate, 2) business, and 3) functional. 
While this definition excludes goals and objectives, it 
recognizes that achievement is the aim of strategy and 
that the combination of objectives, strategy, and 
policies form a "grand design" or master strategy for the 
f irm. 
Change in Strategy. Until recently, the studies in 
strategy have more or less assumed that strategy is a 
static concept. Quinn is one of those who introduce the 
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element of change in strategy by his proposal of logical 
incrementalism. He defines strategy as "pattern or plan 
that integrates an organization’s major goals, policies, 
and action sequences into a cohesive whole" (Quinn, 
1980). According to Quinn, a well-formulated strategy 
helps to marshal and allocate an organization’s resources 
into a unique and viable posture based on its relative 
internal competencies and shortcomings, anticipated 
changes in the environment, and contingent moves by 
intelligent opponents. 
Such an explanation for change in strategy is quite 
different from Lindblom’s. In Lindblom’s (1959) 
definition, a strategy is expected to be changed and 
repeated because of insufficient information possessed by 
the managers, while in Quinn’s definition, a strategy 
will be changed in anticipation of the changes in the 
environment. Andrews (1987) offers another explanation of 
change. He states that " an unique corporate strategy is 
only rhetoric until it is embodied in organization 
activities that are guide by the strategy but in turn 
continually reshape it.” Implementation is a complex 
process including many subprocesses of thought and 
organization that introduce tentativeness and doubt into 
prior resolution and lead us to change direction. 
A Broader Definition. Like Schendel and Hofer, 
Christensen, Berg, and Salter (1980) and Thompson and 
Strickland (1986) define the strategy broadly. They also 
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incorporate Quinn’s (1980) element of change into their 
concept. This approach includes the process of defining 
purposes, objectives, and goals. There are also 
indications of a movement toward an integration of 
analytical/intellectual and behavioral political process 
in strategy making (Fahey, 1981). The theme of this 
movement is that the "technical" or analytical rubric of 
strategy formulation is not sufficient to describe and 
explain the process of strategic decision making and its 
outcome, i.e., implemented strategy. The processes 
involved in acquisition and utilization of organizational 
power, influence and control must be incorporated into 
the paradigms of decision making (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, 
and Theoret, 1976; Pfeffer, 1981; Hickson, et al., 1985). 
Thompson and Strickland (1986: 6) define the 
strategic plan of an organization or organizational 
subunit as a detailed blueprint of management’s answers 
to the three basic strategic questions facing any 
enterprise. These questions are: 
1) What will we do and for whom will we do it? 
2) What objectives do we want to achieve? 
3) How are we going to manage the organization’s 
activities to achieve the chosen objectives? 
Christensen, Berg, and Salter (1980: 5) note that 
precise and exact definitions of strategy are neither 
desirable or possible. They point out that it is more 
useful to focus on what a statement of corporate strategy 
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should encompass. Considering the organizations’ reasons 
for developing a strategy, they define strategy as: 1) 
improvement of the ability of the firm to select 
appropriate basic, long-term objectives for itself; and 
2) development of the means by which these objectives can 
be achieved. 
In the past, the approaches to the concept of 
strategy were more content-focused. The concern has been 
primarily with the "what," or the nature of the action 
recommended rather than with the process or "how” the 
action prescription is arrived at. Recently, some 
authors have adopted the narrow definition of strategy, 
which focuses on the means used to achieve given 
objectives (Evered, 1983; Acar, Chaganti, and Joglekar, 
1985). Mintzberg and his associates define strategy as a 
pattern in a stream of decisions, and decision process as 
a set of actions and dynamic factors that begin with a 
identification of a stimulus for action and end with the 
specific commitment to action (Mintzberg and Waters, 
1985; Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret, 1976). Some 
generally agree with Hofer and Schendel’s (1978) 
delineation of strategy as ’the basic characteristics of 
the match an organization achieves with its environment.’ 
Others put special emphasis on issues such as decision¬ 
making process (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret, 
1976; Fahey, 1981; Fredrickson, 1983; Nutt, 1984; 
Mintzberg and Waters, 1985), uncertainty (Tandon, 1985), 
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perception (Mitroff and Emshoff, 1979; Cosier, 1981; 
Duhaime and Schwenk, 1985), technology (Frohman, 1985a; 
Porter, 1985; Sethi, 1979; Sethi, Movsesian, and Hickey, 
1985), culture (Shrivastava 1985), and competitiveness 
(Porter, 1985). However, despite sustained attempts in 
the literature for synthesis, the concept of strategy 
still remains a cluster of related notions and represen¬ 
tations . 
The Process of Strategic Management 
Chandler’s (1962) definition of strategy separates 
strategy into three distinct parts: 1) the formulation of 
goals and objectives, 2) action plans, and 3) resource 
commitments. The goals and objectives of an organization 
generally represent different types of growth. The 
action plans attempt to carry out the strategy, and 
resources are funds, equipment, or personnel (Chandler, 
1962: 11). The three parts of strategy follow a sequen¬ 
tial order in time. Moreover, this approach assumes that 
an exhaustive analysis can be undertaken before an action 
is taken, which requires that the CEO hold considerable 
power and have access to complete information (Bourgeois 
and Brodwin, 1984). 
Andrews (1987) feels that it is reasonable to 
consider strategy formulation complete before implementa¬ 
tion begins only for the purpose of analysis. In real 
life, we often move without knowing where we will end up; 
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and the determination of purpose is reality in dynamic 
interrelation with implementation. The necessity to 
accommodate unexpected opportunity in the course of 
continuous strategic decision is a crucial aspect of 
process . 
Quinn (1980) also finds that instead of following 
rigidly prescribed formal planning, managers in major 
enterprises tend to develop their most important 
strategies through processes which neither formal 
planning paradigms nor power-behavioral theories 
adequately explain. The most effective strategies of 
major enterprises tend to emerge step by step from an 
iterative process in which the organization probes the 
future, experiments, and learns from a series of partial 
(incremental) commitments rather than through global 
formulations of total strategies. This view is strongly 
supported by the findings of Mintzberg and McHugh (1985). 
By tracking the strategies pursued by the National Film 
Board of Canada, they find that, contrary to the widely 
accepted view of strategy making, strategies are 
"formulated" before they are "implemented,'' strategies 
can be "formed" in a variety of ways. 
In light of the findings by Mintzberg and McHugh 
(1985), Mintzberg and Waters (1985) suggest an alterna¬ 
tive view to the traditional belief of the strategy 
formulation process. They note that in the literature, 
strategy has always been defined in terms of intentions 
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and guidelines for the future -- essentially in terms of 
plans. This translates into restricting research to the 
study of perceptions of what those who make strategy 
intend to do. Mintzberg and Waters (1985) suggest that 
organizations sometimes may not succeed in pursuing their 
intended strategy, and may end up pursuing unintended 
ones. What they define as emergent strategies (patterns 
that are realized without intention) introduces a 
completely new concept to the decision-making process. 
Under this concept, the control to choose among the 
alternatives and shape the future outcome of a plan is 
taken out of the hands of the managers. The final 
outcome of such a strategy is affected by the unforesee¬ 
able and unpredictable elements of the environment. Thus, 
the contribution of managers’ strategies to the success 
of the company is greatly reduced. Under the same 
concept, the failure of the business may be attributed to 
unfavorable changing conditions of the environment beyond 
the control of the manager. 
In their study, Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret 
(1976) find that in the delineation of steps in almost 
any strategic decision process there is not a steady, 
undisturbed progression from one routine to another; 
rather, the process is dynamic, operating in an open 
system where it is subjected to interference, feedback 
loops, dead ends, and other factors. This finding is 
confirmed by Nutt (1984). Nutt finds that not all stages 
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of the normative decision process are invoked in every 
process studied. Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret’s 
(1976) major contribution identified key phases of 
decision making and external factors that influence the 
process. However, a twenty-five-case data base is too 
limited to prove the external validity of their findings. 
In fact, contrary to Mintzberg and his associates’ 
suggestion that managers seldom use formal planning, 
Carter (1987), in his study of the uses of formal and 
informal plans in top executive decision makings, finds 
that top executives prefer using formal plans in making 
decisions and are not influenced in their choice by 
turbulence in their business environment. 
To summarize the above approaches’ findings, 
Thompson and Strickland (1986) outline a continuous and 
evolving process of strategy management (Figure 1). They 
separate the job of managing an organization’s strategic 
game plan into five elements: 
1) Developing a concept of 'what is our business and 
what will it be.’ 
2) Establishing strategic objectives and performance 
targets. 
3) Formulating a strategy to achieve the strategic 
objectives and desired results. 
4) Implementing and executing the chosen strategic 
plan. 
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Phase 1 
Defining the 
business 
and 
establishing 
a strategic 
mission 
Redefine 
as needed 
Phase 2 
Setting strategic 
objectives 
and 
performance 
targets 
Revise as 
needed 
Phase 3 
Formulating 
a strategy 
to achieve 
the desired 
objectives 
and 
performance 
Reformulate 
as needed 
Phase 4 
Implementing 
and executing 
the strategic 
game plan 
Rework as 
needed 
Phase 5 
Evaluating 
performance 
and 
reformulating 
the strategic 
plan 
(Figure 1) 
The Ongoing Process of Strategy Management 
(Thompson and Strickland, 1986: 12) 
5) Evaluating performance and reformulating the 
strategic plan in light of actual experience, 
changing conditions, and new priorities. 
With these five elements, they develop a model of 
the process of strategy management. In their model, 
strategy evaluation is both the end and the beginning of 
the strategy management cycle. They also emphasize the 
following characteristics of the process of strategy 
management: 
- In actual situations it is not always easy to 
distinguish sharply between the phases of strategy 
management. 
- The sequence from "defining the business" to 
"objectives" to "strategy" to "implementation and 
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execution" to "evaluation and reformulation" is 
not something that management actually does in 
lockstep. 
- The tasks of strategy formulation and strategy 
implementation are rarely carried out in planned, 
systematic fashion in isolation from everything 
else. 
- The needs of strategy management are irregular, 
and the progress made in both formulation and 
implementation of strategy usually takes the form 
of incremental adjustments rather than grand 
designs and giant leaps forward. 
From Thompson and Strickland’s (1986) summary, we 
may conclude that although they have delineated the five 
elements of strategy, we will still need more specific 
definitions of what is included in each of those elements 
and what is not included in order to distinguish among 
phases. Also, in their eagerness to incorporate all the 
different findings and theories, there are apparently 
some obvious contradictions in their argument. In 
particular, some of the characteristics of the process 
strategy management which they emphasized not only 
contradict their original model but also seem to have 
been added on as an afterthought. On the other hand, 
they can only choose one side when the view points 
directly contradict each other. This demonstrates the 
difficulty in attempting to develop a general model. 
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There are so many factors to consider that the resulting 
model will be extremely complicated. Mintzberg, 
Raisinghani, and Theoret (1976) suggest that techniques 
such as statistics and computer simulations may be needed 
for further analysis of the problem because of the 
characteristics of the dynamic factors. 
Implementation 
The Concept of Implementation 
In his planning-implementation model Preston Le 
Breton (1965) defines the implementation phase as 
primarily concerned with putting completed plans into 
operation. The implementation process begins after 
official approval has been given to a plan (Le Breton, 
1965:14). In Schendel and Hofer’s (1979) strategic 
management paradigm, implementation is different from the 
other tasks in several important respects. First, 
implementation is essentially an administrative task, 
while goal setting, environmental analysis, strategy 
formulation, and strategy evaluation can be accomplished 
analytically and independently of the organization. 
Second, implementation task is inherently behavioral. 
Lastly, implementation has traditionally been viewed as 
the last step in the strategic management process. 
Attempts to study implementation raise the basic question 
concerning the relationship between thought and action 
(Majone and Wildavsky, 1979): Where does one end and the 
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other begin (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984)? 
As the concept of strategy evolves, the approach to 
implementation also changes. When Quinn (1980) 
introduces the strategies for change, he implies that in 
most cases of strategic management, implementation is a 
gradual, incremental process which alternates with the 
other phases of decision making. When Mintzberg and 
Waters (1985) introduce the different types of strategy, 
what they designate as deliberate strategy and realized 
strategy are just different terms for implementation and 
reformulation of strategy. In other words, their terms 
are similar to phases 4 and 5 of Thompson and 
Strickland’s (1986) model of ongoing strategy management 
(see Figure 1, page 19). Phase 4 is implementing and 
executing the strategic game plan, and phase 5 is 
evaluating performance and reformulating the strategic 
plan . 
The most revolutionary change came as a result of 
the introduction of dynamic factors by Mintzberg, 
Raisinghani, and Theoret (1976). According to their 
findings, strategic decision making is a groping cyclical 
process. Inherent in it are factors causing the decision 
process to cycle back to earlier phases. Quite similar 
to Le Breton’s (1965) intended designs of planning 
within implementation" and "implementation within 
planning," under the dynamic factors, implementation may 
be found at the end of the decision process cycle or be 
22 
recycled to any other stages of the process. Mintzberg, 
Raisinghani, and Theoret (1976) also find evidence in the 
seeking of authorization to proceed with a decision 
process. Such a seeking of authorization may indicate 
the existence of incremental implementation. In 
conclusion, Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) suggest that 
implementation is everywhere. They further warn that 
"the separation of policy design from implementation is 
fatal" except for the purpose of analysis. 
Strategy Implementation 
According to Schendel and Hofer (1979), strategy 
implementation is essentially an administrative task and 
is inherently behavioral. Managers are the professionals 
who practice the discipline of management and carry out 
its functions, and discharge the task at hand (Drucker, 
1973). Chandler (1962:11) further states that 
decisions, either strategic or tactical, usually require 
implementation by an allocation or reallocation of 
resources -- funds, equipment, or personnel. Normally, 
the implementation of the strategic plan requires the 
resources which only the general office can provide and 
the executives who actually allocate available resources 
are the key people in any enterprise. Burns and Stalker 
(1961) suggest that it is the manager’s task is first to 
interpret correctly the market and technological 
conditions, in terms of the market’s instability or the 
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rate at which technological conditions are changing, and 
then to design and implement a the management system 
appropriate to these conditions. 
What makes the job of the general manager so 
complicated when it comes to implementing strategy is the 
number of variables involved. These variables include: 
1) what needs to be done to implement the strategy, 2) 
how fast to push implementation along, and 3) what 
managerial approach to take to put the strategy in place 
(Thompson and Strickland, 1986). Strategy implementa¬ 
tion should be congruent among all the dimensions of the 
organization. There must be a fit within the organiza¬ 
tion that includes the organization’s overall condition 
and setting; the nature of the strategy and the amount of 
strategic change involved; and the general manager’s 
skills, style, and ways of getting things done. Miles 
and Snow (1984) see such a fit as a process as well as a 
state -- a dynamic search that seeks to align the organi¬ 
zation with its environment and to arrange resources 
internally in support of that alignment. 
In practical terms, the basic alignment mechanism is 
strategy, and the internal arrangements are organiza¬ 
tional structure and management process. Miles and Snow 
(1984) go on to argue that perfect fit is strived for but 
never fully attained due to continuous external change. 
In their open system theory, Katz and Kahn (1966) 
emphasizes the close relationship between a structure and 
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its supporting environment. They assume that without 
continued inputs any system soon runs down. In their 
theory, because of the hierarchical ordering of many 
parts of the organizational structure, most transactions 
with the environment are monitored through the managerial 
system. So, the external relationships of an organiza¬ 
tion’s officers comprise a critical set of variables for 
predicting the effectiveness and survival of the organi¬ 
zation itself. 
Weick (1979) and Smircich and Stubbart (1983) 
provide another perspective. They see organization 
members as symbolically "enacting" their environment 
through their social interaction. The task of strategic 
management in this view is "organization making" -- to 
create and maintain systems of shared meaning that 
facilitate organized action. There is broad agreement 
that administrative components of strategy implementation 
revolve around structuring and organizing internal 
activities (Thompson and Strickland, 1986). We will take 
a look at how different implementation processes create 
internal fits and alignment with the external changes. 
Structure and Implementation 
Chandler (1962) defines structure as the design 
of organization through which the enterprise is adminis¬ 
tered. This design, whether formally or informally 
defined, has two aspects. It includes, first, the lines 
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of authority and communication between the different 
administrative offices and officers and, second, the 
information and data that flow through these lines of 
communication and authority (Chandler, 1962:14). John 
Child (1972) defines structure as the formal allocation 
of work roles and the administrative mechanisms to 
control and integrate work activity, including those that 
cross formal organizational boundaries. Galbraith and 
Kazanjian (1986) view structure as the segmentation of 
work into roles such as production, finance, marketing, 
and so on; the recombining of roles into departments or 
division around functions, products, regions or markets; 
and the distribution of power across this role structure. 
In his study of the 70 large corporations, Chandler 
(1962) identifies certain growth strategies that are 
important for ensuring the long-term survival of 
organizations. These strategies are expansion of volume, 
geographic dispersion, vertical integration, and product 
diversification. Changes in a firm's strategy result 
from an awareness of the opportunities and needs — 
created by changing population, income, and technology — 
to employ existing or expanding resources more profitab¬ 
ly. The new strategy brings about new administrative 
problems, which requires a new or refashioned structure 
if the enlarged enterprise is to operate efficiently. 
Although Burns and Stalker (1961:19) emphasize technical 
progress only, they also support the relationship between 
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changes and organizational development. 
Several structural types exist, including the 
centralized functional organization, the decentralized 
multidivisional form, the holding company form, and the 
matrix form (Galbraith and Kazanjian, 1986). A centra- 
1ized organization is characterized by the locus of power 
concentrated at the top of the organization. A decentra¬ 
lized organization is one which power and decision-making 
authority are more evenly dispersed throughout the 
hierarchy and can be found at lower levels in the organi¬ 
zation. The functional organization is usually more 
centralized than the decentralized organization, and its 
departments are specialized and arranged by function, 
such as marketing, finance, and manufacturing. The multi¬ 
divisional organization is generally more decentralized 
than the functional organization, because the departments 
are separated on the basis of product, market, or region. 
The holding company form is one in which even greater 
authority and responsibility are given to the divisions. 
Finally, the matrix organization reflects both a func¬ 
tional and a product orientation. 
Chandler’s (1962) study revealed that structure 
tends to follow the growth strategy of the firm but 
often not until inefficiency and internal operating 
problem provoke a structural adjustment. The experience 
of these firms followed a consistent sequential pattern, 
new strategy creation, emergence of new administrative 
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problems, a decline in profitability and performance, a 
shift to a more appropriate organizational structure, and 
then recovery to more profitable levels and improved 
strategy execution. Generally, firms with single- and 
dominant-product strategies utilize the functional form, 
related business firms have a multidivisional structure, 
and unrelated product firms use a form more typical of a 
holding company. Chandler’s thesis suggests that there 
is no one best way to organize, but that all ways of 
organizing are not equally effective. The choice is 
dependent or contingent upon the growth strategy. 
To implement strategic change, allocation or 
reallocation of resources -- funds, equipment, or 
personnel -- is usually required (Chandler, 1962: 11). 
Chandler’s general thesis is that structure follows 
strategy. This thesis is undergirded by the powerful 
logic that an organization’s structure is just a means to 
an end, not an end in itself. Structure is no more than 
a managerial device for facilitating the implementation 
and execution of the organization’s strategy. The 
structural design of an organization acts both as a 
"harness" that helps people pull together in their 
performance of diverse tasks and as a means of tying the 
organizational building blocks together in ways that 
promote strategy accomplishment and improve performance 
(Thompson and Strickland, 1986). Without deliberately 
organizing responsibilities and activities to produce 
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linkage between structure and strategy, the outcomes are 
likely to be disorder, friction and malperformance 
(Drucker, 1973). Following the same line of argument, we 
may assume that change of structure caused by allocation 
or reallocation of resources is one of the implementation 
processes of corporate strategy. 
Andrews (1987) define implementation of strategy as 
comprised of a series of subactivities that are primarily 
administrative. If purpose is determined, then the 
resources of a company can be mobilized to accomplish it. 
An organizational structure appropriate for the efficient 
performance of the require tasks must be made effective 
by information systems and relationships permitting 
coordination of information systems and relationships 
permitting coordination of subdivided activities. The 
organizational processes of performance measurement, 
compensation, management development -- all of the 
enmeshed in systems of incentives and controls -- must be 
directed towards the kind of behavior required by 
organizational purpose. Organization structure and 
processes of compensation, incentives, control, and 
management development influence and constrain the 
formulation of strategy. It is logical to propose that 
structure should follow strategy, but in reality, 
strategy also follow structure. The formulation and 
implementation of corporate purpose are highly 
interdependent. 
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Since the work of Chandler, the relationship between 
strategy and structure has been the subject of a number 
of conceptual and empirical studies. A few studies 
support Chandler’s dictum that structure follows 
strategy. Rumelt (1974) reports some data from the 
American study which bear on this point. His data show 
that firms shifting from either a single or dominant 
product strategy to a more diversified strategy during 
any given 10-year period were more likely to change to 
multidivisional structure than were firms that both began 
and ended a decade with a single or dominant product 
strategy. He further confirms that the multidivisional 
firm follows the diversification strategy as Chandler 
predicted. From 1949 to 1969, the functional structures 
among Fortune 500 firms decreased from 63 percent to only 
11 percent, while the multidivisional firm increased from 
20 to 76 percent. Daniels, Pitts, and Tretter (1984) 
find that there is a relationship between organizational 
characteristics and structure in their study of U.S. 
multinationals. They find that as long as the foreign 
sales are low as a portion of total sales, most companies 
handle foreign operations merely as an appendage to 
existing product or functional divisions. Increasing 
dependence on foreign sales will lead to a change from a 
worldwide product to an international division structure. 
And once an international division grows to be larger 
than domestic product divisions, there is a tendency to 
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split it into two or more areas to provide a better 
balance of size among divisions. 
While the above studies support Chandler, the 
majority find that his dictum is less than the whole 
truth. Hall and Saias (1980) argue that although 
structure follows strategy, structure also partly 
determines strategy. They point out that Chandler was 
not interested in the process of strategy formulation, 
which he took as given. Often, structural characteris¬ 
tics act like filters and limit what the organization 
observe -- both of itself and its environment. In 
reality, structure result from a complex play of 
variables other than strategy: culture, values, the past 
and present of functioning of the organization, its 
history of success and failure, the psychological and 
sociological consequences of technological development, 
and so on. Structure then assumes political content in 
the same way as strategy, and there is no reason to 
subordinate one to the other. Pethia ( 1982) questions 
the validity of the studies on the relationship of 
structure and strategy by attacking the concepts of 
diversification and of the multidivisional structure 
(MDS). By using Chandler’s own definition of diversifi¬ 
cation to examine Chandler’s and some other large sample 
studies, he concludes that there is no support for the 
idea that there is a close relation between diversifica¬ 
tion and adoption of the MDS. 
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Other authors find that the relationship between 
structure and strategy is not as simple as it seems. A 
number of studies claim that size, not strategy is the 
principal determinant of structure (Meyer, 1972; Grinyer 
and Yasai-Ardekani, 1981; Foster and Gooding, 1984). 
Others find that structure is related to the environment 
and performance (Lenz, 1980), the age of the organization 
(Glisson and Martin, 1980), technology (Alexander and 
Randolph, 1985), and the decision maker’s choice (Ford 
and Hegarty, 1984). Galbraith and Kazanjian (1986) 
summarize in that strategy does make a difference in 
terms of the degree of diversity (related-unrelated 
diversification) pursued as well as the market structure 
characteristics of the firm’s specific product-market 
positions. Secondly, the choice of strategy must be 
matched with an appropriate organization form. Thus, the 
strategy-structure fit is probably only one among several 
key linkages. Galbraith and Kazanjian (1986) provide the 
following guidelines regarding strategy and structure: 
1. Performance is the product of multiple factors, 
of which two primary one are: 
a. Matching strategy to industry structure and 
core skills. 
b. Matching organizational structure to strategy. 
2. Given a strategy that requires greater or lesser 
diversity, position in industrial settings 
characterized by favorable market variables, the 
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firm must organize to match structure to the 
primary demands of strategy. 
a. Single-business and dominant-business firms 
should be organized in a functional structure. 
b. Related diversified firms should be organized 
in a multidivisional form. 
c. Unrelated diversified firms should be 
organized in a holding company structure. 
d. An early adoption of a strategy-structure fit 
can constitute a competitive advantage. 
Galbraith and Kazanjian (1986) further emphasize 
that structure is only one of a number of managerial 
variables that must be consciously designed in accordance 
with the strategy of the firm. 
Based on the studies in the area of structure and 
strategy, it is obvious that most of the elements that 
may influence the design of the organizational structure 
are so highly correlated that it is impossible to isolate 
any one element for research. The most widely accepted 
view is expressed by the contingency theory, which 
dictates that the effectiveness of a given organizational 
structure depends on such situational characteristics as 
the environment that the firm faces, the tasks that it 
undertakes, and the people involved in the performance of 
those tasks. As for Chandler’s dictum of structure 
follows strategy, Hall and Saias (1980) suggest to 
interpret Chandler’s position that ’unless structure 
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as meaning: follows strategy, inefficiency results.' 
'Unless structure matches strategy, inefficiency 
results.’ Whatever our conclusion may be, we cannot deny 
the importance of structure in the study of 
implementation process. 
Control as Implementation 
Management control systematically sets performance 
standards consistent with planning objective (Mockler, 
1972). The conventional model of control essentially 
consists of some objective or standard to be achieved, 
the measurement of accomplishment, a comparison of the 
objective or standard with the accomplishment, and the 
taking of corrective action if the results fall outside 
the tolerance limits of deviation (Michael, 1984). Most 
often, control in organizations refers to the financial 
control of budgets; recently, there have been some new 
concepts and interpretations. Those related to 
implementation will be discussed below. 
Financial control. When Alfred Sloan first wrote 
the 'Organization Study’ for General Motors as a possible 
solution for the specific problems created by the 
expansion of the corporation after World War I, his 
objective was to achieve better control of GM’s divisions 
(Sloan, 1972). He noticed that under the prevailing 
practice of intracorporate relations, he could not 
determine the rate of investment of the divisions (Sloan, 
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1972:52). No one knew how much was being contributed by 
each division to the common good of the corporation. In 
the absence of such information, it was impossible for 
the general officers of the corporation to determine 
where to invest the money to the best advantage, and some 
of the officers used their membership on the Executive 
Committee to advance the interests of their respective 
divisions. The purpose of Sloan’s study was to formulate 
rules and regulations pertaining to interdivisional 
business. His basic argument in the ’Organization Study’ 
is that the profit resulting from any business considered 
abstractly is no real measure of the merits of that 
particular business. It is not a matter of the amount of 
profit but the relation of that profit to the real worth 
of investment capital within the business. Based on his 
’Organization Study’ he recommended financial control by 
developing statistics correctly reflecting the rate of 
return. His implementation of financial control resulted 
in the reshaping and redesigning of the organization. 
These data were later used by Chandler in his work in 
Strategy and Structure. 
Feedforward control. Most current control systems 
rely on feedbacks. Unfortunately, feedback signals error 
or deviation from the desired performance after the fact 
and correction does not take effect immediately. As we 
wait for the result from the feedback, the deviation 
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tends to persist and the costs incurred tend to rise. 
Koontz and Bradspies (1972) and Steve Michael (1980) 
adapt an approach used in engineering systems and come up 
with a suggestion for feedforward control. Engineering 
feedforward control meets the problem of delay in feed¬ 
back systems by monitoring the effects on outcome varia¬ 
bles. Michael perceives the contribution of feedforward 
control as narrowing the gap between expected and actual 
results. "Feedforward permits advance correction only in 
approximate terms; it can reduce error but it cannot 
eliminate it. Hence feedback is necessary to make the 
actual and final adjustment of the organization to its 
environment (Michael, 1980)." The most widely used 
techniques of future-directed control are the various 
kinds of forecasting. The principle of forecasting is 
based on the current expectancies to predict probable 
results. Forecasting will not work if previous critical 
data are not available. Feedforward control monitors the 
results of previous implementation and uses them as the 
standard for the current ones. Therefore, feedforward 
control may be considered as one of the implementation 
processes. 
Interactive planning. Strategic management involves 
the detection of emerging environmental threats and 
opportunities, the prediction of their future impact, and 
the development of the organization’s response. Ideally, 
the future can be predicted with enough confidence to 
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justify whatever commitment is needed by the resulting 
action plans. Because the environment is so uncertain 
and fast moving with many potential threats and oppor¬ 
tunities, the organization often finds it difficult to 
react using conventional strategic management approaches. 
Ansoff (1984) proposes that the appropriate management 
approach is to exercise the strategic option of deve¬ 
loping organizational flexibility and using interactive 
planning. In his effort to explain logical incremen¬ 
talism, Quinn (1980) also points out that one of the 
greatest possible errors in managing technical program is 
to freeze plans too soon. He suggests that the most 
current feedback from the marketplace and technical 
communities must be introduced into the development 
process for as long as possible. He argues that highly 
adaptive learning interactions with outside information 
sources and strong incentives to use the information 
obtained are among the primary reasons why high-morale 
small companies can so often outdesign larger electronics 
companies or huge planned bureaucracies. 
One reason for using incremental planning is that 
human beings often naturally resist change (Hotter and 
Schlesinger, 1979). People resist change when they do 
not understand its implications; assess the situation 
differently from the initiator; and have low tolerance 
for change. Administered properly, interactive planning 
may help overcome such resistance. Another reason is our 
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limited intellectual capacities and insufficient 
information. Because of such limitations, practitioners 
can expect to achieve their goals only partially, and 
would be expected to repeat their policy making endlessly 
as conditions and aspirations change and as the accuracy 
of prediction improves (Lindblom, 1959). 
Competitive Advantage and Implementation 
Porter (1980) defines competitive strategy as 
involving the positioning of a business to maximize the 
value of the capabilities that distinguish it from its 
competitors. It is obvious that the 'positioning of a 
business’ involves implementation. According to Porter 
(1980), competitive advantage cannot be understood by 
looking at the firm as a whole. It stems from many 
discrete activities that a firm performs in designing, 
producing, marketing, delivering, and supporting its 
product. Each of these activities can contribute to a 
firm’s relative cost position and create a basis for 
differentiation. Porter (1985) introduces the value 
chain as the basic tool for systematically examining all 
of a firm’s activities. The value chain disaggregates a 
firm into its strategically relevant activities so that 
the behavior of costs and the existing and potential 
sources of differentiation can be better understood. A 
firm gains a competitive advantage by performing these 
strategically important activities more cheaply or better 
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than its competitors. Porter separates the value 
activities of the firm into two groups: the primary 
activities and the support activities. The primary 
activities are inbound logistics, operations, outbound 
logistics, marketing and sales, and service. The support 
activities are procurement, technology development, human 
resource management, and firm infrastructure. While the 
primary activities are the day-to-day operating activi¬ 
ties of the firm, the support activities deserve further 
explanation and defining. 
Technology Technological change can either create 
or destroy profits, markets, and industries. Examples of 
significant technological impacts on business are 
numerous. A company that integrates technology into its 
strategy significantly improves its chance to compete 
(Frohman, 1985a). Whether it decides to be a technologi¬ 
cal leader or not, the results of integrating technology 
into strategy can improve a company's determination of 
priorities among technology options, identify the 
technical resources needed to achieve business goals, and 
speed up the movement of ideas into production. The 
company can also better focus on its internal technical 
efforts and tune its external technical monitoring to 
specific issues facing the business (Frohman, 1985b). 
However, not all technological change is strategi¬ 
cally beneficial. Indeed, it might worsen a firm’s 
competitive position and industry attractiveness (Porter, 
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1985). Porter argues that technological change is not 
important for its own sake, but is important if it 
affects competitive advantage and industry structure. 
High technology does not guarantee profitability. Due to 
their unfavorable structure, many high technology indus¬ 
tries are much less profitable than some low-technology 
industries. 
Technology will affect competitive advantage if it 
has a significant role in determining relative cost 
position or differentiation. Porter (1985) argues that 
since technology is embodied in every value activity and 
is involved in achieving linkages among activities, it 
can have a powerful effect on both cost and differentia¬ 
tion. He introduces several tests for determining a 
desirable direction of technological change: 
- The technological change itself lowers cost or 
enhances differentiation and a technological lead 
is sustainable. 
- The technological change shifts cost or uniqueness 
in favor of a firm. 
- Pioneering the technological change translates 
into first-mover advantages besides those inherent 
in the technology itself. 
- The technological change improves overall industry 
structure. 
Human resource management. Human resource 
management consists of activities involved in the 
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recruiting, hiring, training, development, and 
compensation of all types of personnel. Human resource 
management affects competitive advantage through 
determining the skills and motivation of employees and 
the costs of hiring and training. A critical issue in 
human resource management is compensation. 
The appraisal portion of the strategic plan has long 
been a problem. The concept of "pay-for-performance" is 
widely accepted by the business community. Nonetheless, 
executive compensation has come under increasing 
criticism (Rappaport, 1983). Existing compensation 
programs often incorporate three major roadblocks to the 
selection and execution of value-creating strategies by 
corporate executives: 
1) The increased pay for increased size phenomenon 
— the relatively high association between firm 
size and executive compensation can only fuel 
management’s natural inclination to expand 
businesses as fast as possible. 
2) The relatively heavy weighing attached to short¬ 
term performance in incentive compensation 
packages. 
3) The invariable reliance on such accounting 
measures as earning and return on investment 
rather than economic performance measures for 
both short and long-term plans. 
To avoid the above problems, researchers have 
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designed plans to link strategy, performance and 
compensation. Some examples are the bonus system with 
MBO (Migliore, 1982), which is an application of bonus 
system within Management By Objective (Odiorne, 1969); 
and Value Performance Plans (Rappaport, 1983). These 
plans adapt executives compensation packages to the long¬ 
term objectives of the organization, and therefore, 
should be adjusted for adaptation. 
Procurement. According to Porter’s (1985) theory, 
procurement refers not to the purchased inputs them¬ 
selves, but to the function of purchasing inputs used in 
the firm’s value chain. Though purchased inputs are 
commonly associated with primary activities, purchased 
inputs are present in every value, activity including 
support activities. 
Firm infrastructure. Firm infrastructure consists 
of a number of activities, including general management, 
planning, finance, accounting, legal, government affairs, 
and quality management. In Porter’s (1985) value chain, 
infrastructure, unlike other support activities, usually 
supports the entire chain and not individual activities. 
Depending on whether a firm is diversified or not, its 
infrastructure may be self-contained or divided between a 
business unit and the parent corporation. In diversified 
firms, the infrastructure is typically split between the 
business unit and the corporate level. 
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Politics and Implementation 
Political activities reflect the influence of 
individuals who seek to satisfy their personal and 
institutional needs by the decisions made in an 
organization (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret, 1976). 
These individuals may be inside or outside of the 
organization. What ties them to the decision process is 
their belief that they will be affected by the outcome. 
Their political activities serve to clarify the power 
relationships in the organization. They can also help to 
bring about consensus and to mobilize forces for the 
implementation of decisions. 
Hickson, et al. (1985) present a different picture 
of politics in an organization. They contend that the 
top managers of an organization are all playing a 
decision making game. Such a game is serious for the 
players involved sinee it is the setting for career 
struggles. Because an organization is a shifting multi¬ 
goal coalition of stakeholders, numerous interests are 
drawn into strategic decision making — internal depart¬ 
ments, divisions, subunits, and external customers, 
clients, suppliers, government departments and agencies, 
all of which can exert influence. Therefore it is not 
surprising that decision making does not follow a fixed 
course. It may run into "interruptions" and "recycle" 
again and again (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret, 
1976), while "sequential attention to goals" (Cyert and 
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March, 1963) swings the emphasis first one way, then 
another. 
Power in organization. Pfeffer (1981) defines 
organizational politics as those activities taken within 
organizations to acquire, develop, and use power and 
other resources to obtain one’s preferred outcomes when 
there is uncertainty or disagreement about choice. Power 
is a force, a store of potential influence through which 
events can be affected. Politics involves activities or 
behaviors through which power is developed and used in 
organizational settings. Power is the property of the 
system at rest; politics is the study of power in action. 
From the definition of power, it is clear that political 
activity is undertaken to overcome resistance or 
opposition. Because political activity is focused around 
the acquisition and use of power, it can be distinguished 
from activity involved in making decisions which uses 
rational or bureaucratic procedures. In both rational 
and bureaucratic models of choice, there is no place for 
and no presumed effect of political activity. Decisions 
are made to best achieve the organization’s goals, either 
by relying on the best information and options available, 
or by using rules and procedures which evolved in the 
organization. In contrast, political activity implies 
the conscious effort to muster and use force to overcome 
opposition in a choice situation. 
Pfeffer defines the first condition of the use of 
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power as interdependence, a situation in which what 
happens to one organizational actor affects what happens 
to others. He defines the second condition as hetero¬ 
geneous goals, which are inconsistent with each other. A 
related condition would be heterogeneous beliefs about 
technology, or the relationship between decisions and 
outcomes. The third condition is scarcity. To the extend 
that resources are insufficient to meet the various 
demands of organizational participants, choices have to 
be made concerning the allocation of these resources. 
Organizational actors build power from: 1) providing 
resources, 2) coping with uncertainty, 3) being 
irreplaceable, and 4) affecting the decision process. 
Power is exercised through the use of the outside 
experts, controlling the agenda, coalitions, cooperation, 
and committees. 
Institutionalization of power. One of the most 
important administrative function is the development of 
common understandings about the world within the 
organization. This function serves to legitimize the 
organization in its external environment and to increase 
the commitment of those within the organizational 
coalition. Political language and political symbols are 
instruments for all who contest the organization’s 
decision. Language, symbols, rituals, and ceremonies are 
used to manage the process by which actions and events 
are given meaning (Rosen, 1985) . The process is managed 
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to legitimize and support the organization’s desired 
behaviors and actions which are to be carried out within 
the organization. 
Behavioral Approaches to Implementation 
The various branches of the behavioral approach 
generally reflect a shared belief in the social and self- 
actualizing nature of people. People at work are assumed 
to act on the basis of (1) desires for satisfying social 
relationships, (2) responsiveness to group pressures, and 
(3) the search for personal fulfillment (Schermerhorn, 
1984). This basic assumption has its roots in the 
Hawthorne studies and the seminal theory of human needs 
developed by Abraham Maslow. 
Theory X and Theory Y Douglas McGregor (1960) 
advance the thesis that managers could benefit greatly by 
giving more attention to the social and self-actualizing 
needs of people at work. He feels that managers must 
shift their view of human nature from what he calls 
"Theory X" to "Theory Y". McGregor’s (1960) Theory Y 
includes a willingness for people to exercise self- 
control in their work. Self-control occurs when the 
individual determines how things should be done and 
exercises personal discipline in accomplishing perfor¬ 
mance results. People will do this only for matters to 
which they are committed. Thus, managers who expect 
others to exercise self-control should be allow them to 
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participate in the decisions through which the objectives 
and standards are initially set. 
Job Enrichment and Job Enlargement Chris Argyris 
(1957) argues that certain classical management princi¬ 
ples are inconsistent with the mature adult personality. 
The resulting incongruence between individual personality 
and the organization cause conflict, frustration, and 
failure for people at work. He suggests for the managers 
to accommodate the mature personality by expanding job 
requirements to include more task variety and responsibi¬ 
lity; and to adjust supervisory styles to include more 
participation and better human relations. 
Japanese Management Drucker (1971) posits that 
Japan’s success in their economic growth and performance 
after the War is attributable to Japan’s policies of: 1) 
making effective decisions by 'consensus’; 2) harmonizing 
employment security with other needs such as productivi¬ 
ty, flexibility in labor costs, and acceptance of change; 
3) and developing young professional managers. It would 
be impossible for managers in the West to imitate these 
policies because they are deeply rooted in Japanese 
traditions and culture. Yet, Drucker believes that the 
principles underlying these Japanese practices deserve 
close attention and study in the West because they may 
point the way to a solution to some of our most pressing 
problems. 
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Perception 
Perception and Attitude 
Perception. After studying some definitions of 
perception in the field of psychology, Howard Bartley 
(1958) found it customary for authors to act in accord 
with the following: 
1. That perception may be dealt with by 
general description, without necessarily 
introducing a formal definition for the 
reader. It is as though it were taken for 
granted that most people know pretty much, in 
general, what perception is, and that any 
further discussion of it can be carried out 
simply by adding new illustrative material, 
or new anecdotal items. 
2. That when definition are offered, they 
need only be fragmentary, general, and need 
not place perception in relation to the other 
processes that go to make up the individual’s 
overall behavior. 
3. That sensation may still be looked upon 
as an elementary process underlying 
perception. (1958, p. 12) 
The same conditions seem to prevail in management, 
where the majority of authors who discuss perception 
generally take its definition of perception for granted. 
March and Simon (1958) are among the few authors who have 
attempted to define perception. They describe perception 
as a complex interweaving of affective and cognitive 
processes which define a situation in a particular way 
for an actor. Whether inside or outside administrative 
organizations, humans behave rationally only relative to 
some set of "given'' characteristics of the situation. 
Four sets of givens define a situation as it appears to 
the rational actor. They include knowledge or 
48 
probability assumptions about future events (e.g., 
distributions of future events), knowledge of 
alternatives available for action, knowledge of 
consequences attached to alternatives -- knowledge that 
may be more or less complete -- and rules or principles 
for ordering consequences or alternatives according to 
preference. 
Attitude♦ In studying attitude, Fishbein and Ajzen 
(1975) find that despite the vast amount of research and 
publication of countless books and articles on the topic, 
there is little agreement about what an attitude is. 
They feel that this may be, in part, attributable to its 
use as an explanatory concept in diverse areas of 
investigation. Most investigators intuitively select a 
particular measurement procedure that seems to fit the 
purpose of their study. Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) 
emphasize the necessity of distinguishing among beliefs, 
attitudes, intentions and behavior. These four variables 
have often been used interchangably in the past. 
Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) suggest that the distinction of 
the variables not only will permit us to classify 
previous research into conceptually independent 
categories but will also serve to eliminate many apparent 
inconsistencies. 
From the management view-point, Courtney Brown 
(1976: 16) defines attitude as "a relatively enduring 
organization of beliefs around an object or situation 
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predisposing one to respond in some preferential manner." 
He further defines belief as "an inference made by an 
observer about underlying states of expectancy." In 
comparing the meaning of perception and attitude, beside 
noticing the common ambiguity and confusion, one can 
readily observes the similarity between Courtney Brown’s 
definition of attitude and March and Simon’s definition 
of perception. In this study, these terms will be used 
interehangably. 
Perception and Behavior 
Behavioral scientists have long been interested in 
the study of the relationship between peoples’ attitudes 
and their behavior. From time to time, investigators 
have tried to test the assumption that attitude serves as 
a behavioral predisposition. One of the best know 
studies is Richard LaPiere’s (1934) investigation of 
racial prejudice. He investigated whether or not he 
could predict peoples’ prejudiced behaviors from their 
self-reports of prejudice. In the early 1930s, LaPiere 
accompanied a young Chinese couple in their travels 
through the United States. Visiting 251 restaurants, 
hotels and other establishments, they were refused 
service only once. Six month later, LaPiere wrote to all 
of the places where they have stopped, asking if they 
would give service to Chinese guests. Of the 128 places 
that responded, ninety-two percent state that they would 
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not serve Chinese guests. 
Other studies also failed to find a significant 
relationship between verbal reports and behavior. One 
example is Corey’s (1937) attempt to measure students’ 
attitudes toward cheating and then used these measures to 
predict actual cheating on a set of tests. This measure 
of cheating behavior was found to be completely unrelated 
to the student’s attitude toward cheating. These 
findings raised serious doubts about a strong relation 
between attitude and behavior (Petty and Cacioppo, 1981). 
To explain the failure of attitude to predict 
behavior, both Doob and Thurstone argue that the same 
attitude can be expressed in different actions. While 
knowledge of a person’s attitude can tell us little about 
whether he/she will perform some particular behavior, it 
can tell us something about his/her overall pattern of 
behavior (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980). Although 
performance or nonperformance of a specific behavior with 
respect to some object usually cannot be predicted from 
knowledge of the person’s attitude toward that object, a 
specific behavior is viewed as determined by the person’s 
intention to perform the behavior itself. According to 
Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) conceptual framework, a 
person’s intentions in the final analysis are a function 
of certain beliefs. Rather than being beliefs about the 
object of the behavior, they are concerned with the 
behavior itself. Some of these beliefs influence the 
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person’s attitude toward the behavior. Specifically, the 
attitude toward performing a given behavior is related to 
beliefs that performing the behavior will lead to a 
certain consequences and one’s evaluation of those 
consequences. This attitude is viewed as one major 
determinant of person’s intention to perform a behavior 
in question. 
Perception and Strategy 
As decision makers, managers are charged with 
formulating, directing, coordinating, and managing the 
organization’s response to environmental change (Kiesler 
and Sproull, 1982). A crucial component of managerial 
behavior in rapidly changing environment is the cognitive 
processes of noticing and constructing meaning about 
environmental change so that the organization can take 
action. Recent research on social cognition has began to 
provide that understanding by revealing processes and 
outcomes that indicate how managers analyze a changing 
environment (Kiesler and Sproull, 1982; Bartunek, Gordon 
and Weathersby, 1983; Cragin, 1983; Kleinmuntz, 1985; 
Gioia and Manz, 1985). 
Until recently there was little research on the 
study between the relationship of managerial perceptions 
of the environment and their effect on strategies. 
However, quite a few significant studies have been 
published since the mid eighties. Some examples are: 
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Bourgeois * (1985) study on top management perceptions of 
uncertainty and corporate strategic goals, Wilson and 
Kenny’s (1985) study on managerially perceived influence 
over intradepartmental decisions, and Fombrun and Zajac’s 
(1987) study of intraindustry stratification as a func¬ 
tion of top manager’s responses to perceptions of their 
environments. 
Summary 
After studying the different views on the formula¬ 
tion and implementation of strategy, it is obvious that 
there are some contradiction among the different authors. 
However, under all the arguments for detail and fine 
points, we can find some general consensus. Basically, 
the formulation and implementation of strategy are inter¬ 
dependent of each other and these in turn depends on the 
ability of the managers to effectively utilize the 
different resources that are available. 
From our discussion on perception, we may conclude 
that the behavior of an individual is affected by their 
perception. As Andrews (1987) indicates, the determina¬ 
tion of a suitable strategy for a company begins in 
identifying the opportunities and risks in its environ¬ 
ment. Unfortunately, in most occasions, managers will 
have to operate with insufficient information. As a 
result, they will have to rely on their instinct and 
their perception of the environment. When we combine the 
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above conclusions, it implies that 
implementation of strategy is rela 
of their environment by the manage 
ability to most effectively utiliz 
resources. 
the formulation and 
ted to the perception 
rs and their perceive 
e their available 
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CHAPTER III 
THE ROLE OF BUSINESS IN GOVERNMENT 
REGULATION AND TRADE POLICY 
Introduction 
Miles and Snow (1984) see implementation as a 
dynamic search that seeks to align the organization with 
its environment and to arrange resources internally in 
support of that alignment. Katz and Kahn (1966) see the 
external relationships of an organization’s officers as 
comprising a critical set of variables for predicting the 
effectiveness and survival of the organization itself. 
Weick (1979) and Smircich and Stubbart (1983) see 
organization members as symbolically "enacting" their 
environment through their social interactions. Such an 
open systems approach to organizations as well as the 
emphasis on strategic behavior of organizations as open 
systems has fostered an interorganizational perspective 
(Ullmann, 1985). From the behavioral point of view, 
government regulation can redistribute wealth. Business, 
as a social sub-system, attempts to influence government 
regulations as a way to compete for scarce resources 
(Zardkoohi, 1985). From the strategic view, the 
participation of corporations in political processes 
constitutes strategies to monitor and influence the 
external environment (Keim, Zeithaml, and Baysinger, 
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1984) . 
Political involvement and political power are 
inextricably linked (Sethi, 1982). Where political 
Participation might be viewed by one group as a positive 
democratic system, another group might construe 
such participation as the abuse of 
USe of P°wer and an attempt 
to subvert democratic processes. This chapter looks at 
the different views of business- political involvement 
and examines some theories of its legitimacy both from 
the U.S. and Canadian side. 
^ili^s and Government in the 
Many of the critical problems plaguing business are 
the result of changes in external forces and constraints 
In response to these pressures corporations have begun 
devoting extensive resources to external affairs 
projects, long-range planning, and public relations 
campaigns (Aplin and Hegarty I960; Lorange, 1982; Ungson, 
■lames and Spicer, 1985). The development of effective 
strategies for coping with governmental regulation has 
proven especially perplexing (Weaver, 1977; Rom, 1979). 
his Study Of the political process and the roles 
°f the business corporation in American politics, Epstein 
cone 1 udes .* 
areriand busi"ess corporations have been, 
re, and, m the foreseeable future, will 
undoubtedly continue • i , . 11 
DoHhoQi continue to be involved in the 
from IK Process. This involvement results 
from the corporate presence in a pluralistic 
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democracy in which diverse social interests 
seek to enhance their economic positions vis- 
a-vis each other. Moreover, the extent of 
corporate political activity will probably 
increase. (1969, p. 6) 
"The controversy which creates the substance of 
politics" in this country includes more than merely the 
justifying and the opposing of governmental programs. It 
involves the determination of relationships of power and 
influence among diverse social interests and the many 
organs of government (Epstein, 1969). 
Historical Background 
During the Colonial period, the merchant’s role was 
to move Americans along the road to a more business 
oriented culture. However, this culture was not exactly 
the type of business culture that was to be the rule in 
the later periods (Cochran, 1974). According to Cochran, 
the influences on the development of American culture by 
the merchants of the Colonial period is not as important 
as the legacy of a commercialized agriculture passed on 
by planners and farmers. 
During the mid-nineteenth century when state 
legislatures often operated as markets where government 
favors such as franchises and tax relief were for sale 
and protection against adverse regulations also had to be 
bought, lawyers at the state capitals were indispensable 
to businessman. In spite of the appearance of corruption 
in the aid of business, such governments not only exacted 
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costly tribute from new enterprises, but failed to 
provide the legislative reliability and stability 
necessary for financing highly capitalized long-run 
ventures. To find some firm context for lasting 
commitments, businessmen turned to the common law and the 
courts, particularly to the state supreme courts 
(Cochran, 1974). During this period, the actions of 
government officials, particularly those of the federal 
government, had an increasingly greater impact on 
managerial decisions. However, their impact was mostly 
indirect and generally in the form of shaping the 
environment where management made its decisions 
(Chandler, 1977). 
In 1887, Congress passed the Interstate Commerce Act 
to regulate the railroads. However, the act had little 
effect on the operation of the carriers, since the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, which was established 
under its provisions, was merely a fact-finding agency 
with no coercive powers. The second great regulatory 
milestone, the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, had a 
similar history. Passed despite its opposition by 
leading corporations, particularly the Standard Oil 
Company, the act was sufficiently limited and ambiguous 
to be easily circumvented. Presumably, the Sherman 
Antitrust Act (1890) and the rest of the antitrust laws 
were passed to halt the spread of business monopoly and 
to restore effective competition to the market economy. 
58 
Yet, revisionist analysis of the Clayton Act, the Federal 
Trade Commission Act, and the Robinson-Patman Act has 
severely shaken this conventional view; various scholars 
have demonstrated that these particular "antitrust" 
statutes were often supported and employed by established 
business interests to restrain and restrict competition 
(Armentano, 1982). The primary effect of both pieces of 
legislation was to provide expensive nuisances for the 
affected corporations and to delude the public into 
believing that effective regulation existed (Epstein, 
1969 ) . 
According to Epstein (1969), the failure of the 
business community to prevent the Depression destroyed 
the faith that many Americans had placed in such 
assertions during the 1920’s and contributed to the 
election of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Corporate 
political responses largely took the form of opposition 
to the New Deal legislative program by means of the 
trade-association activity and massive public relations 
campaigns designed to convince the public of the evils 
confronting them. Also, corporations poured large sums 
of money into electoral efforts to defeat 'that man in 
the White House." Significantly, during the first 
Roosevelt administration, the Supreme Court served as a 
buffer between the business community and the 
administration’s legislative program. During 1935 and 
1936 alone, the Court declared seven major New Deal acts 
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unconstitutional . Among the pieces of New Deal 
legislation that have traditionally been considered 
"antibusiness," only the National Labor Relation Act of 
1935 (Wagner Act) interfered significantly with classic 
corporate prerogatives. That act authorized governmental 
supervision of two key aspects of business activity -- 
cost and authority. The impact of the Wagner Act was 
mitigated a decade later with the passage of the Taft- 
Hartley Act in 1947 (Epstein, 1969). 
During World War II, the mobilization of the war 
economy brought corporation managers to Washington to 
carry out one of the most complex exercises ineconomic 
planning in history. That experience lessened 
ideological anxieties about the government’s role in 
stabilizing the economy. Then the fear of postwar 
recession and consequent return of mass unemployment 
brought support for legislation to commit the federal 
government to maintaining full employment and aggregate 
demand. Although the Employment Act of 1946 was passed 
only through the concerned efforts of liberal and labor- 
groups, businessman in general had began to see the 
benefits of a government commitment to maintaining 
aggregate demand. They supported the efforts of both 
Democratic and Republican administrations during the 
recessions of 1949, 1957, and 1960 (Chandler, 1977). 
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Legitimacy 
Before the late nineteenth century, questions of 
legitimacy relating to the business corporation mainly 
addressed the legitimacy of the ends and means of 
government power in affecting corporations, rather than 
the legitimacy of corporations’ use of the facilities 
that the law had provided for them (Hurst, 1970). 
According to Hurst, the public had been troubled by the 
grant of corporate charters conferring valuable public- 
utility-type franchises (Werner, 1981). The expansion of 
trade in the first decades of the nineteenth century 
caused business enterprises to specialize in the 
financing and transportation of goods. They found it 
advantageous to pool large amounts of capital to improve 
financial and transportation services by setting up 
corporations in banks, turnpikes, and canals (Chandler, 
1977). This charters were issued in the form submitted 
by applicants with only minor modification (Werner, 
1981 ) . 
Brandeis also points out that there were fears about 
the charter of business corporations (Werner, 1981). 
These included the fears about "monopoly," "encroachment 
upon the liberties and opportunities of the individual, 
further some were concerned that "the absorption of 
capital by corporations, and their perpetual life, might 
bring evils similar to those which attended mortmain. 
There was a sense of some insidious menace inherent in 
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large aggregations of capital, particularly when held by 
corporations.” 
Our concern is the extent to which businesses can 
participate legitimately in political processes in 
attempting to gain resources (or access to resources) to 
further their own interests (Wood, 1985). Epstein (1969) 
defines legitimacy as 
a belief in and acceptance of the 'rightness, 
propriety, moral goodness’ or 
'appropriateness’ of particular persons, 
institutions, or modes of behavior. (1969, 
p.254) 
He states that the question of corporate political 
legitimacy has two parts -- internal and external. The 
internal issue is related to the mode of governance of 
the corporation or the basis of the authority of managers 
to make decisions for the firm and the identification of 
the constituency to which they are responsible. The 
external issue concerns the relationship between the 
corporation and other participants in the American social 
order. Such external issue raises the question of 
whether corporate political participation differs funda¬ 
mentally from that of noncorporate actors and thereby 
renders the former improper. 
Hurst uses the legitimacy concept as a tool for 
understanding the development of corporate law (Werner, 
1981). According to Hurst, the legitimacy of an 
institution is measured by its utility to some end other 
than its own perpetuation and by its responsibility or 
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accountability to some judgment other than that of its 
power-holder. Hurst concludes that society relied upon 
regulation external to the corporation - „ot upon cor¬ 
poration law or internal governance structure - to 
enforce the corporation’s responsibility to its immediate 
economic functions and its broader social relations 
(Werner, 1981,. As for external legitimacy, in terms of 
both the utility and the responsibility of institutions, 
there has been an increase in public policy directed 
towards the business corporation in the United States 
after the apparent policy equilibrium of the 1880’s 
(Hurst, 1970). According to Hurst, by the 1930’s what 
had begun as competitive chartering in a handful of 
states had set a national pattern of corporation law. By 
then in most states of commercial, industrial, or finan- 
lmportance, the available incorporation statute was 
an enabling act, offering to those organizing or control¬ 
ling a corporate board the opportunity to arrange its 
structure according to their own wishes. 
Following the arguments of Berle and Means’ (1933) 
erosion doctrine, Epstein agrees that the question of 
internal legitimacy based on traditional legal and 
economic theory is no longer valid. The selection proce 
dure in the giant public corporations is largely ritua¬ 
listic since the incumbent management controls the proxy 
machinery and the shareholders are largely impotent. 
Epstein argues that the internal legitimacy of the 
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corporation derives from (1) the selection of corporate 
leadership in a manner viewed as proper by the public, 
and (2) "’managerial ... commitment to the enterprise and 
... acceptance of rational, public criteria by which its 
actions may be judged* resulting in an inner-dynamic 
tendency within modern management 'toward a progressive 
reduction in the arbitrariness of decision making* 
(p.268 ) . " 
Epstein (1969) based his arguments for the external 
legitimacy of corporate political activity on the 
following: 
1) Individual versus group political activity. 
While it is correct to suggest that individual 
political participation is basic to a democracy, 
Epstein argues that the chief social values 
cherished by individuals in modern society are 
realized through groups. 
2) If the political participation of membership 
associations is legitimate, so should be that of 
corporations. 
3) The importance of social pluralism and economic 
interdependence in contemporary American society 
requires corporations to be active political 
participants and thereby justifies the external 
legitimacy of corporate political involvement. 
4) Public acceptance of corporate political 
involvement provides another basis of 
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legitimacy. 
5) The final indication of the acceptance of the 
legitimacy of corporate political activities is 
the acknowledgement of corporate politics by 
government. 
Archie Caroll (1981) views legitimacy as a dynamic 
process. He sees "legitimacy as a 'condition’ that 
prevails when there is congruence between the organiza¬ 
tion’s activities and society’s expectations.” As the 
society’s norm and values change, business must change if 
legitimacy is to be continued. 
How U.S. Business Became Involved in Politics 
In response to pressures, corporations have begun 
devoting extensive resources to external affairs 
projects, long range planning, and public relations 
campaigns (Aplin and Hegarty 1980; Lorange, 1982; Ungson, 
James and Spicer, 1985). The formulation of political 
strategies is complicated by changes in philosophies 
underlying business-government relations. The prevailing 
tendency among business executives to lump whatever is 
happening under the heading of "regulation" obscures the 
tremendous scope of the transformation that is occurring 
in the corporate environment (Windsor, Greanias and 
Jones, 1983). We must consider not just economic regula¬ 
tion, but an emerging law of government control which 
encompasses the full range of rules affecting business 
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decision. 
The transition from a laissez-faire philosophy to 
one embodying extensive governmental involvement in 
business decisions is manifest in many ways (Aplin and 
Hegarty, 1980). According to Aplin and Hegarty, tradi¬ 
tionally, federal regulatory agencies were industry- 
specific, narrow in scope, lacking in enforcement powers, 
and concerned primarily with fostering the development of 
their industry. The older independent regulatory 
agencies, such as CAB, FCC, FTC, ICC, and so on, were 
designed to prevent monopoly, increase competition, 
prevent abuses of managerial practice, and establish 
uniform standards of safety, security, communications, 
and financial practice. In contrast to these earlier 
agencies, the newer federal agencies have been issue- 
oriented versus industry-oriented. The scope of these 
agencies and the volume of regulations they produce are 
unparalleled in the U.S. history. 
The actual response of organizations to regulations 
may be directed externally to influence the authorizing 
legislation, the implementation of regulations and 
enforcement practices. Alternatively, or in conjunction 
with externally directed influence attempts, an organiza¬ 
tion may respond internally by changing structures and 
processes to conform to the new regulatory requirements 
or by diversifying out of the regulated industry to avoid 
regulations (Cook, et al., 1983). The internal responses 
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are related to corporate strategies and implementation 
which have been discussed above. The following discus¬ 
sion then will focus on external interorganizational 
responses. 
Federal government bodies affect the activities of 
organizations and individuals as they frame legislation 
to ameliorate economic and social ills. Consequently, 
any proposed legislation or action of these bodies is of 
concern to various sectors of society. America’s tradi¬ 
tion of political pluralism aggravates this situation by 
permitting all segments of society to voice their 
opinion. Pluralism inevitably produces conflicts between 
groups and individuals striving to achieve mutually 
exclusive objectives (Aplin and Hegarty, 1980). To 
achieve their goals these individuals and organizations 
exert intense pressure on legislators, key policymakers, 
legislative assistants, and standing committees of 
Congress . 
Lobbying efforts assume many forms. Corporations, 
society groups and other government bodies use 
information-based strategies as their major techniques 
for influencing legislative proposal. inion groups use 
political appeals as an influence strategy. Societal 
interest groups gain much of their power because of their 
fiduciary relationship with a broader cross-section of 
society (Aplin and Hegarty, 1980). 
Traditionally, the strategy of the majority of top 
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business executives in the United States has been to 
maintain a low profile in the public forum. Until the 
1970s, the most important and influential nationally 
active business lobbying and advisory groups were either 
industry-specific or were so panindustrial as to impede 
any quick or effective mobilization of corporate 
resources (McQuaid, 1980). Because of their broad and 
heterogeneous membership, larger American corporations 
could neither use the US Chamber nor the NAM (US Chamber 
of Commerce and the National Association of Manufac¬ 
turers) to lobby effectively against regulatory laws. 
As big businessmen become increasingly aware that they 
needed new avenues of collective and individual access to 
government to influence the formulation and implementa¬ 
tion of regulatory legislation, they begin involving new 
types of lobbying and advisory groups to accomplish their 
goals. The Business Roundtable (McQuaid, 1980) is one 
such group. To solve the access problem, large business 
targeted their CEOs on congressmen whose districts 
contain plants or other subsidiaries of their firms. 
Besides its regulatory activities, the U.S. 
government is also responsible for a group of promotion 
and protection policies including direct subsidies, loans 
and loan guarantees, import protection, and price 
supports. In reviewing these policies of promotion and 
protection it will be noted that the reasons for such 
policies range widely. According to Greer (1987), much 
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their motivation is simply special interest politics. 
The few individuals and firms that benefit usually 
benefit a great deal while the many that consequently pay 
higher taxes or higher prices pay relatively little. One 
reason that special interest politics can succeed is a 
disparity in the concentration of benefits relative to 
costs. A second reason is logrolling, which is simply 
the exchange of political favors. The Chryler bailout of 
1981 is an undisputable example of the above forces 
{Iacocca and Novak, 1984; Reich and Donahue, 1985). 
The International Scene 
In the international scene, as always, economic 
conditions change rapidly, with growth in some countries 
and stagnation in others. Similarly, political 
conditions change, some countries becoming less stable, 
others more so. Legal and attitudinal trends change in 
relation to different kinds of businesses, typically 
according to an irregular global pattern. In total, the 
changes in the international order calls for particular 
strategic planning responses. To this end, Lorange 
(1982) suggests the development of procedures that would 
permit a firm to have a realistic picture of emerging 
issues and the gathering of information regarding 
positions of one’s supporters and one’s adversaries, so 
that firms will be able to develop the appropriate 
strategy to deal with the changes. 
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Since the 1940’s, United States has relied on the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as a guide 
for its planning and negotiation on trade matters (Dam, 
1970). Recently, the U.S. government’s continuing 
dissatisfaction with the rules and dispute settlement 
procedures of GATT (Dale, 1980) has focussed attention on 
various steps that individual nations can take to reduce, 
deter, or offset trade barrier and "unfair" trade 
practices of other countries (Baldwin and Thompson, 
1984). Most of these steps are based on the provision of 
GATT which permits a country to impose countervailing 
duties against subsidized imports and dumping practice of 
another nation. 
The trade policy position of companies becomes more 
protectionist when they face greater pressure from import 
competition, benefit less from access to foreign markets, 
and are less diversified in the products they produce and 
sell (Pugel and Walter, 1985). All these difficulties 
reflects U.S. firms’ limited ability to react to import 
competition through internal readjustment of production 
activities. Their inability to compete ’fairly" in the 
international arena has fueled suggestions for a retalia¬ 
ting strategy for trade negotiations to bolster the 
competitive position of United States industries (Baldwin 
and Thompson, 1984). 
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Corporation and Its Political Power 
Business appears to be a very powerful political 
actor. Is corporate political power excessive? What is 
the extent of corporate influence on government today? 
By what criteria should the proper limits to the 
political power of the corporation be judged? 
Firms exposed to the international competitive 
environment inevitably have a stake in national trade 
policy (Pugel and Walter, 1985). Based on the argument 
of the divorce of control from ownership and thus lacks 
clearly defined guidelines of managerial accountability, 
critics of corporate political power are primarily 
concerned that the modern corporation will overwhelm 
other social interests competing in the political process 
and thereby achieve dominance over the formal and 
informal institutions of American government (Epstein, 
1969 ) . 
Basing their argument on subjective-expected-utility 
theory, Bacharach and Lawler (1980) argue that interest 
groups operate, for the most part, in a live-and-let-live 
world. As long as their gain is maximized, they care 
little about the gain of the others. Epstein (1969) also 
argues that power must be distinguished from power 
potential. "Although a social actor may possess both a 
base of power (resources or assets) and the means ojf 
power (the specific actions by which one can use these 
resources to influence the behavior of another), the mere 
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existence of these power possibility is not, per se, 
power." 
Epstein (1969) has suggested that the political 
influence of corporations enterprise should be judged 
excessive if it persistently threatens to deny other 
social institutions effective access to, and influence 
upon, centers of governmental decision making. Judged by 
this standard, he concludes: "Corporate political power 
does not presently constitute a danger to the American 
pluralistic democracy, which continues to produce 
legislation, rulings, decision and programs that are 
contrary to the desires of significant corporate 
interests (p.303).M 
Jacoby (1973) and O’toole (1981) agree that the 
dream of the free market remains enticing for most 
Americans. Jacoby notes a relative reduction in the 
political power of older institutions like the 
corporation and the labor interests. He predicts that 
with these, there will come a great reduction in the 
chance that American society will ever be dominated by 
any single interest bloc. Lenway (1983) also finds that 
although Epstein’s work does not hold true in the 
international area, U.S. trade policy has not been more 
protectionist in the post World War II period. Given 
that the incentives for interest groups to organize in 
favor of protection are very strong, there appear to be 
limits on the ability of business to influence public 
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policy in the international dimension. Lenway (1983) 
concludes that such limits are caused by a policy to 
abide by the regulations of GATT and by concerns over 
possible retaliation by other countries. 
A Comparison of the U.S. and Canadian Government 
Thomas (1980) and Kornberg, Clarke and Goddard 
(1980) find that the operation of parliamentary government 
has long since ceased to reflect the pattern depicted in 
the classic Victorian model. In both Canada and Britain, 
effective power appears to have "passed from the monarch 
to Parliament; from Parliament to Cabinet; from Cabinet to 
public service; and now, from public service to Prime 
Minister." Thomas observes that the movement toward 
presidential government may even have progressed further 
in Canada than in Britain. He further observed that 
although there are obvious and even growing parallels 
between presidential and parliamentary government, the 
differences are substantial and of much greater 
significance for the operation of national decision¬ 
making processes. 
Thomas has compares the two governmental systems in 
three areas I political environment, governmental 
structure, and governmental performance. An abstract of 
his findings is presented in the following. 
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Political Environment 
The similarities between Canadian and American 
societies and their respective political systems are: 
both are pluralistic democracies with heterogeneous 
populations; both have affluent capitalist economies with 
strong welfare state components; and both are organized 
as continental federal systems. 
There are, however, notable and striking areas of 
differences that affect the political life of the two 
nations. These areas include political culture, 
political parties, and interest groups. 
Political Culture. American political culture has a 
revolutionary heritage and is grounded in Lockian 
individualism. To this day, the consensus on political 
ideas in the United States is basically anti- 
governmental. In contrast, Canada lacks a revolutionary 
background and its political culture is distinguished by 
four mutually reinforcing elements: a pragmatic 
appreciation of government’s economic role; a corporatist 
theory of society; a strong tradition of deference 
towards authority; and quasi-participative individual 
political involvement. 
American attitudes towards authority are less 
deferential than Canadian, and political participation 
tends to be greater in the United States. There is a 
pronounced difference between Canadian and American 
nationalism. Canada has always struggled to achieve 
national unity. The ethnolinguistic distinction between 
English Canada and French Canada reinforces strong 
regional and provincial differences and loyalties. In 
such a polity, cultural and regional fragmentation is 
transcended through a process of elite accommodation in 
which the political leaders of the various subcultures 
bargain to maintain the viability of the national 
political system. The elites share an awareness of the 
dangers of fragmentation, a commitment to maintaining a 
national identity and a pragmatic willingness to 
compromise in order to achieve it. The masses remain 
committed to support their respective elites. Most of 
the bargains and compromises that result from elite 
accommodation would not be possible if they were subject 
to popular approval. The strong pattern of deference 
towards authority and the quasi-participative nature of 
mass politics in Canada are thus highly functional for 
the process of elite accommodation. 
American politics is a form of pluralism in which 
multiple elites govern with mass support or acquiescence 
through bargaining and mutual adjustment within the 
framework of a broad consensus. Elite competition, the 
continuous circulation of elites, overlapping group 
memberships and the spontaneous rising of countervailing 
power-centers combine to prevent monolithic elite 
domination. 
Political Parties Non-legislative parties in Canada 
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and the United States present several interesting 
similarities and differences. Both of the major Canadian 
parties and the two American parties have historically 
performed brokerage functions rather than acting as 
linkage between public opinion and public policy in 
accordance with the responsible party model. The 
brokerage function of the major parties arises out of 
different systemic imperatives. 
In Canada, it is primarily a form of elite accommo¬ 
dation that obscures social divisions. In the United 
States, it is an operational necessity if a party wishes 
to capture the presidency. Each major party must attempt 
to forge a winning electoral coalition within its frame¬ 
work. This requires as broad a social, economic and 
geographic base as can possibly be formed and can only be 
accomplished through bargaining and compromise over 
issues and commitments regarding appointments and 
policies. 
The most striking difference between Canadian and 
American political parties lies in the degree of 
legislative party cohesiveness. In Canada, nominations 
are controlled by a cadre of leaders in constituency- 
level organizations. The electorate has virtually no 
impact on the selection of party candidates. Central 
party leaders often suggest candidates, although they are 
in no position to dictate to local organization leaders. 
However, the latter tend to consider loyalty to the 
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national party in the selection process. To some extent, 
party rather than electoral control over selection of 
candidates contributes to party discipline in Parliament. 
The use of primary election to select candidates in the 
United States prevents party organizations at all levels 
from controlling candidates selection and severely limits 
party influence as a result. The consequences are 
profound for legislative party cohesion and for the 
pattern of decision-making in Congress. 
Interest Groups. In both Canada and the United 
States, interest groups are recognized as functionally 
necessary and legitimate participants in the political 
process. Their roles in the two polities are similar, 
but not identical. In both nations they provide a form 
of functional representation that supplements formal 
geographic representation. They are important sources 
of advice and information for government officials, and 
they share in the governing process. The principal 
differences between Canadian and American interest groups 
are tactical and operational and derive from the basic 
structural distinctions between presidential and 
parliamentary government. In Canada, interest groups 
target their activities primarily on the executive, both 
Cabinet and bureaucracy. In the United States their 
efforts are more broadly distributed across the 
legislature, the bureaucracy, and the electorate. 
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Governmental Structure 
The Executive-Legislature Relationship. The most 
fundamental difference between Canadian and American 
government institutions lies in the relationship between 
the executive and the legislature. In Canada, the two 
institutions are joined together and have the same 
electoral base. Parliament is a strong and viable 
mechanism because the executive is in Parliament. 
Executive and legislative leadership are fused in the 
Cabinet which also ties the bureaucracy to Parliament. 
It is not possible to define independent spheres of 
legislative and executive authority or to distinguish 
between governmental functions on a structural basis. 
In the United States, the Constitution formally 
separates the executive and the legislature while 
allowing each to share some of the powers of the other. 
Their membership does not overlap. Executive and 
legislative leadership is provided by different 
individuals who do not necessarily belong to the same 
party. The executive is not formally responsible to the 
legislature, but both are accountable to the electorate. 
The bureaucracy has ties to both Congress and the 
presidency that often pull in different directions. 
Legislative Organization. In addition to the basic 
structural differences involving presidential and 
parliamentary government, there are important secondary 
differences between the United States and Canada with 
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respect to legislative organization, executive 
organization and federalism. The most striking 
organizational difference between Parliament and Congress 
involve the power of the upper chamber, the role of 
standing committees, the availability of staff service, 
and party cohesiveness. In contrast to its Canadian 
counterpart, the United States Senate enjoys equal 
authority with the lower House. Each member of the House 
and Senate has a sizable personal staff to aid in the 
performance of legislative work, rendering service to 
constituents and managing political relations with the 
constituency. However, the autonomous status of 
congressional committees, the independent power of their 
chairman and the viability of committee jurisdiction 
fragment power in Congress. 
Executive Organization. The collegial nature of 
executive leadership in Canada as opposed to the 
individual leadership of the President is an obvious 
distinction. The collective responsibility of the 
government means that power stakes are collective and 
the Cabinet must defend those stakes collectively. The 
Prime Minister cannot individually define and defend the 
power stakes of his government as the President must do 
for his Administration. The relationship between the 
President and Cabinet member is an individual one, but it 
usually preludes closed personal association. The 
Cabinet member can best serve the President by 
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maintaining a discreet measure of independence from him. 
Federalism. There are two major differences in the 
patterns of intergovernment relations between Canada and 
the United States: the relative power of provincial 
(state) and national governments, and the mechanisms for 
funding and implementing national programs. The Canadian 
provinces stand in a stronger position vis-a-vis Ottawa 
than do the states vis-a-vis Washington. Provincial 
political leaders play a more important ongoing role in 
national policy-making than do their counterparts in the 
American states. 
In the United States, most federal programs that do 
not involve automatic entitlement to benefits are 
implemented through categorical grant-in-aid. Congress 
makes the grants conditional upon matching funds by the 
recipients and compliance with various guidelines and 
regulations. The extend of federal control that 
accompanies categorical grants is a constant source of 
conflict between federal, state and local authorities. 
In contrast to the United States, Canada has since 1941 
moved steadily away from reliance on conditional grants. 
It employ instead a complex system of tax-sharing under 
which the provinces are free to collect their own taxes 
or have the federal government do it for them. Provinces 
have been running their own programs rather than merely 
sharing in the cost and administration of federal 
programs. As a result, a system of consultative 
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federalism" has developed that extends well beyond the 
co-operative federalism involved in a system that relies 
primarily on grants-in-aid. 
Government Performance 
The basic structure differences in the United States 
and Canada result in contrasting patterns of decision¬ 
making and in the performance of different governmental 
functions. In both nations, political forces seek access 
wherever effective power over policy is located and 
decisions are made by bargaining among elites through a 
process of elite accommodation. 
The American Pattern. Modern presidential 
government in the United States is highlighted by the 
diffusion of power among independent institutions. This 
affords interest groups a multiplicity of access points 
to press their demands. The presidency is the principal 
governing institution along with the bureaucracy. 
However, the President does not command. He must build a 
governing coalition through persuasion. Since 1973, 
Congress has been reasserting its authority over foreign 
and military policy. In matters involving domestic and 
economic policy, the President is expected to present a 
legislative program for congressional consideration and 
is required to submit a budget and to prepare an economic 
report. Congressional consideration of the President s 
legislative program and the budget is a complex process 
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the outcome of which is by no means predetermined. 
Autonomous administrative agencies that distribute 
benefits or regulate economic activity, interest groups 
which are the agencies’ clientele and congressional 
committees or subcommittees that have legislative and 
appropriations jurisdiction over the agencies comprise the 
three components of pervasive Washington phenomenon, the 
policy subgovernment. Neither the President, the White 
House staff, appointed political executives or party 
leaders in Congress can control or even penetrate a 
smoothly running subgovernment. 
The Canadian Pattern. The structural fusion of 
legislative and executive leadership and functions 
seemingly imparts decisiveness, adaptability and 
responsiveness to Canadian government that are lacking in 
the American presidential system. The centralization of 
power in the Cabinet limits the formal participants and 
stages in the policy process and reduces the number of 
access points for the inputs of interest-group demands. 
Under prime ministerial leadership, the Cabinet 
develops the government’s legislative program and 
financial measures and direct their movement through 
Parliament. Closed negotiations are held within the 
Cabinet over the content of legislation. Consultations 
are held with administrative and political leaders in the 
provinces with ministers and indirectly through the 
bureaucracy. The expansion of the bureaucracy has made 
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it an important center of power. Its policy role is 
substantial and is based on information, expertise, and 
discretion. Career officials in central agencies perform 
key co-ordination functions and public officials 
participate actively in Cabinet committee decisions. The 
close relationship between career officials and Cabinet 
ministers makes the bureaucracy a prime interest-group 
target. 
On April 17, the Constitution Act, 1982 was enacted 
in Canada. The Constitution Act, enacted the principle 
that no law made by the English Parliament would extend 
to Canada other than at the request and consent of 
Canada. The Constitution Act, also includes a guarantee 
of rights expressed in Part I: Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms (MacEllven, 1983). This Charter sets out 
guarantees for fundamental freedoms and democratic, 
mobility, legal, equality, and linguistic rights. The 
Constitution Act was introduced as a resolution of the 
House of Commons and Senate addressed to the British 
Parliament (Manser, 1985). Thirty items (Acts or orders) 
are listed in the schedule, but of these six are repealed 
(Banks, 1985). All of these items are acts that were in 
existence before the enactment of the Constitution, 
therefore the enactment of the Constitution has no direct 
effect on the business and government relationship. 
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Business and Government in Canada 
Interest Groups 
There are several reasons for the lack of consensus 
for the omnipresence of a degree of coercion in 
government decision making (Trebilcock, et al., 1982). 
One reason is that many of the objectives are intangible 
and not susceptible to commonly accepted definition, much 
less measurement. Another reason is that there is little 
agreement about either the inescapable trade-off between 
competing objectives or the effects of particular policy 
changes upon their realization. An individual’s interest 
is to protect and enhance his comprehensive net worth 
over time (Hartle, 1979). This involves fending off 
incursions of others, grasping those rare gains that can 
be obtained at no one’s expense, and increasing his own 
interests at the expense of others where this is 
consistent with the law, social pressures, and his own 
conscience. In government decision making, this includes 
the attempt to change government rules and obtain 
government rulings, or prevent unfavorable rulings, as a 
kind of investment by individuals in improving their 
wealth. 
The players who participate in the government 
decision making process may be separated into three 
distinct groups the conflict resolving group, the media, 
and the special interest groups (Hartle, 1979). 
The first group includes members of the part> 
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candidates, ministers, deputy ministers, and regulatory 
agency heads. They are actively participating in the 
conflict resolution process by virtue of the fact that 
they are holders of offices. 
Because of the enormous importance of voter 
perceptions in the whole decision making process, and the 
role of the journalist in interpreting to the voter what 
is transpiring in the public decision making system, the 
media has a major effect on collective decision making 
(Hartle, 1979; Kornberg and Wolfe, 1980; Trebilcock, et 
al., 1982). 
The third group that is pressing for special 
interests includes: corporate executives, labor leaders, 
and association executives. The chief executive officers 
of corporations are usually assumed to seek to maximize 
profits on behalf of the shareholders who hold him 
accountable although such assumption may not always hold. 
From this perspective, seeking government intervention 
that would increase corporate profits, and battling 
government intervention that would reduce corporate 
profit, is one of the responsibilities of the executive 
office. Investing in manipulating government decisions 
one way or another, where the potential benefits are 
expected to exceed the costs, is just part of the job 
(Hartle, 1979). 
The heads of associations of labor unions have 
inward-1ooking responsibilities that include resolving 
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inter-union jurisdictional disputes and encouraging the 
member unions to finance unionization of the unorganized. 
Their vital responsib 
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order to be effective, the national organization needs 
the strong support of its corresponding provincial 
organizations. However, if the provincial organizations 
support the national organization too strongly, they will 
alienate their members (Coleman and Grant, 1985). 
The Business-Government Relationship 
Murray and McMillan (1983) developed a ’'conceptual 
map" of the overall relationship between business and 
government in Canada. They organized the current 
literature into five schools of thoughts, each of which 
supported a different set of explanations for the present 
state of business-government relationship in Canada. The 
five basic schools are: 
1) the general social structures and ideological 
context school ("macro" perspective); 
2) the interpretive school (negative values, 
attitudes and beliefs of the parties); 
3) the failure of business school; 
4) the failure of government school; and 
5) the failure of the interaction process school 
In a survey of 243 chief executives officers and 
senior federal public officials, Taylor and Murray (1987) 
find support in the "interpretive school of thoughts. 
They argue that subjective interpretations of reality 
significantly affect the outcome of the interactive/ 
consultative process between business and government. 
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At the time of the survey, in the spring of 1984, they 
find that there were massive differences between business 
and government leaders on the general state of the 
business-government relationship. The business community 
felt that the relationship had deteriorated badly, that 
the government was too left wing and interfered too much 
in the economy. Government respondents agreed that there 
had been deterioration but they did not go nearly as far 
as the business respondents. They felt that their 
policies in general were just about right and that 
business had suffered a decline in public esteem. In 
the findings, both sides agreed that business did not 
take a sufficient professional approach to their dealings 
with government. Both groups were more or less equally 
split over the such matters as business leaders not 
understanding how the democratic process in government 
works, the extent to which the chief executive officer’s 
job pressure keep them from attending to relations with 
government, the extend to which they ought to use 
lobbyists, and the strength of industry and trade 
associations in influencing government. Finally, the 
vast majority of all respondents to the survey felt that 
there was not enough face-to-face interaction between the 
key actors on both sides, that the timing, content, 
structure, and process of the interactions that do occur 
are often inappropriate, and that there is not enough 
cross-over in career between the worlds of business, 
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politics, and government administration. In sum, Taylor 
and Murray’s survey reveals that business respondents see 
the root problem as imbedded in various failure within 
government, in particular in the roles of politicians and 
senior civil servants. They also see, to a lesser 
extent, a problem in the way they organize themselves to 
make policy decisions. These beliefs are not widely 
shared by the politicians and civil servants. Government 
leaders attribute cause to certain characteristics built 
into business leader’s role in society - an explanation 
which businessmen tend to reject. 
Later, Bartha (1985) finds that there is a 
significant heightened awareness of the importance of 
external problem, especially those emanating from 
government policies. However, "many corporations do not 
have strategies, implicit or otherwise, for dealing with 
the issues created by government and other changes in the 
environment." Bartha attempt to explain such a contra¬ 
diction from the chief executive officer’s perspective. 
He points out that there are two distinct aspects to 
business-government relationship: systemic and competi¬ 
tive. At the systemic level are the macro issues of 
public policy that affect all members of a collective 
group - an industry, a sector or even the business 
community as a whole. At the competitive level are the 
micro concerns that influence the performance of an 
individual entity - a firm or its specific business units 
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- in relation to its competitors. Bartha speculates that 
CEOs are unable or unwilling to accept individual respon¬ 
sibility for dealing with what they regard as a collec¬ 
tive problem. As a result, the task of strategically 
managing external relations at a systemic level, then, is 
entrusted to collective units - industrial trade 
associations and broadly based organizations such as the 
Business Council on National Issues, the Canadian Chamber 
of Commerce and the Canadian Manufacturing’ Association. 
Summary 
Based on the above discussion, we may conclude that 
government policies have profound effects on the profita¬ 
bility of a firm. Although there are differences between 
the presidential and parliamentary systems, both systems 
provide multiple access points for business to influence 
government decision making process. Such influence is 
more pronounced in Canada than in the U.S. because of the 
corporatist theory of society in Canada and the more 
diffused power in the political system in the United 
States. While most of the scholarly attention is 
concentrated on influences that brought to bear on public 
policy formulation, there is little empirical work 
devoted to the study of the influences themselves. 
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CHAPTER I V 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND TRADE THEORY 
Introduction 
International economics deals with the economic 
relations among nations. Most nations of the world 
export some goods, services and factors of production in 
exchange for imports which could only be supplied 
relatively less efficient at home, or not at all. Thus a 
great deal of the economic well-being of most nations 
rests crucially on international interdependence. 
International trade theory can be regarded as an 
extension of general economic theory to the special 
problems encountered in trades between nations. Although 
the emphasis has traditionally been on trades between 
countries, the theory can also be applied to problems of 
trades between other economic units. There are several 
reasons to refer to the theory as international trade 
theory rather than as general trade theory (Heller,1973). 
First, as a general rule a vast different exists in the 
degree of mobility of resources between countries as 
opposed to within countries. Second, human beings, the 
factor of production labor, are often restricted in their 
freedom of movement between countries. Third, financial 
transactions within countries are usually unrestrained, 
but international capital flows are often prohibited or 
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severely limited by government authorities. Fourth, 
land, another important resource is severely restricted 
as far as its international mobility is concerned. 
Fifth, economic environment, such as taxation, capital 
market, is more homogeneous within a country than it is 
between units located in different countries. Sixth, the 
sociopolitical environment often differs greatly between 
nations. 
We will first look at some classical economic 
theories, then pure trade theories, protectionism and 
balance of payments. 
Classical Economic Theories 
The Mercantilist View on Trade 
The economic philosophy known as mercantilism was 
popular in such countries as Britain, Spain, France and 
the Netherlands from the sixteenth to the middle of the 
eighteenth century. Among the more important aspects of 
mercantile ideology were: (1) the identity of money with 
wealth, (2) political unification and strong government, 
(3) protectionism and state intervention, and (4) power 
(Steiner and Steiner, 1985). 
Mercantile practices differed among the European 
states but they generally sought to maintain centralized 
political power at home and a military power that could 
be exercised in the foreign interests of the sovereign. 
The mercantilists reasoned that a strong nation state was 
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one that was wealthy. These states therefore determined 
to control their economic systems at home and to expand 
their empires abroad in order to acquire as much of the 
world’s precious metals as possible. Exports were 
stimulated and imports were restricted. Colonies were 
considered to be useful in achieving the major purpose of 
accumulating precious metals and be a source of sales of 
finished goods. 
Adam Smith 
In 1776, Adam Smith published his famous book, The 
Wealth of Nations, in which he attacked the mercantilist 
view on trade and advocated free trade as the best policy 
for the nations of the world. He assumed that human was 
rational and recognized the age-old urge of individuals 
to increase their wealth. The wealth of a nation were 
the aggregate wealth of the individual members of the 
population. Thus, the wealth of a nation would increase 
most rapidly if individuals were left free to pursue 
their own interests as they saw fit. Smith argued that 
with free trade, each nation could specialize in the 
production of those commodities which it had an absolute 
advantage, or could produce more efficiently. This 
international specialization of factors in production 
would result in an increase in world output which would 
be shared by the trading nations. Thus a nation need not 
gain at the expense of other nations -- all nations could 
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gain simultaneously. 
The Role of Government♦ Although he discussed the 
'invisible hand’ in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam 
Smith did not accept a rigorous laissez faire policy. 
Instead, he advocated a limited sphere of government 
interference in economic affairs. He presented the 
duties of the government as follows: 
1) the duty of protecting the society from the 
violence and invasion of other independent 
societies; 
2) the duty of establishing an exact administra¬ 
tion of justice; and 
3) the duty of erecting and maintaining certain 
public works and certain public institutions, 
which it can never be for the interest of any 
individual. 
John Mill 
John Stuart Mill was a philosopher of the English 
utilitarian school. His thinking in trade greatly 
influenced the development of Ricardo’s theory. One of 
his earlier writings in economics, "An Essay of the 
Impolicy of a Bounty on the Exportation of Grain (1804), 
advocates for free trade. In his essay, Mill condemned 
all forms of interference in the market for provisions. 
In his latter essay, "Elements of Political Economy 
(1826), Mill pointed out the advantages of free trade. 
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Because of their close relationship it is difficult to 
decide who was the first to come up with the arguments. 
However, the same arguments used by Ricardo in his theory 
of comparative advantage. 
Mill argued in favor of restricting government 
economic regulation in order to avoid political evils 
(Steiner and Steiner, 1985). His strongest reason 
against the extension of government power was the social 
debilitation he felt government regulation tended to 
bring. He maintained that whenever people look conti¬ 
nuously to government to resolve problems of their joint 
concern, whenever people expected to have everything done 
for them except matters of mere routine, their faculties 
were only half developed. 
The Pure Trade Theories 
Ricardo1s Law of Comparative Advantage 
Ricardo stated that even if a nation had an absolute 
disadvantage in the production of both commodities with 
respect to the other nations, mutually advantageous trade 
could still take place. The less efficient nation should 
specialize in the production of and export of the 
commodity in which its absolute disadvantage is less. 
This is the commodity in which the nation has a 
comparative advantage. On the other hand, the nation 
should import the commodity in which its absolute 
disadvantage is greater. This is the area of its 
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comparative disadvantage. This is known as the Law of 
Comparative Advantage. 
Ricardo based his reasoning on a number of simpli¬ 
fying assumptions: 1) two nations and two commodities; 2) 
free trade; 3) perfect mobile labor within a nation but 
completely immobile labor internationally; 4) constant 
costs of production; 5) no transportation costs; 6) no 
technological change; and 7) labor is the only factor of 
production (Kreinin, 1971). The Law of Comparative 
Advantage can most easily explained by a simplified 
example used by Kreinin. Assume the world consists of 
two countries, A and B, that produce two commodities, 
wheat and textiles. Suppose further that the only factor 
of production employed in producing the two goods is 
labor in a homogeneous form. This means that the value 
of each product is determined exclusively by its labor 
content, or "labor theory of value." Goods moves freely 
between the two countries but labor is mobile only 
domestically, not internationally. Transportation costs 
are also assumed not to exist. 
Suppose that the production condition prevailing in 
the two countries are those of Table 1. 
Table 1. One Man-day of Labor Products 
Country 
A 60 bushels of wheat 20 yards of textile 
B 20 bushels of wheat 10 yards of textile 
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It is obvious that labor is more productive in 
country A than in country B in both the textile and the 
wheat industries. However, a vertical comparison of the 
figures in Table 1 shows that the degree of country A 
advantage over country B is not the same in both 
industries. The wheat industry has an advantage of 3 to 
1, but the textile industry only has an advantage of 2 to 
1. Comparative speaking, therefore, country A has a 
greater advantage in wheat and lesser advantage in 
textile. Country B is in the reverse position. 
Domestically, country A must give up 3 bushels of wheat 
to obtain 1 yard of textile. It would be eager to 
purchase textile abroad if a yard could be obtained for 
less than 3 bushels of wheat, because then the resource 
cost of textile embodied in the wheat traded is less than 
that of forgoing wheat product in order to produce the 
textile at home. From the country B’s point of view, 
domestically, the resource of 1 yard of textile is 2 
bushels of wheat. If it is able to obtain through trade 
more than 2 bushels of wheat per yard of textile, it will 
trade. In sum, the appropriate comparison for each 
country is between the resource cost of the commodity 
produced at home and the cost when it is acquired from 
abroad in exchange for the export good. 
The Demand and Supply of Trade. So far, we have 
dealt with the supply conditions in each nation, almost 
to the complete neglect of the demand side. A feature of 
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the Ricardian example is that trade leads each country to 
specialize completely in the production of the commodity 
in which it has a comparative advantage. The 'complete 
specialization’ arises from the assumption that produc¬ 
tion costs per unit of output remain constant as output 
expands or contracts. If we have an 'increasing cost’ 
condition, the prices in the two countries will converge 
and once the marginal unit price is the same in the two 
countries, there is no inducement for trade to expand 
f urther. 
The Modern Theory. 
The productivity comparison between the two 
countries is possible only because of the existence of an 
international common denominator -- a given quantity of 
homogeneous labor. This also implies that either labor 
is the only factor of production or that labor is used in 
the same fixed proportion in the production of all 
commodities. The labor theory of value is rejected 
because the two above assumptions are not true in today’s 
society. Instead an opportunity cost theory and the 
production possible curve are introduced in the modern 
theory of value to overcome these shortcomings. 
The Heckscher-Ohlin Theory. The Heckscher-Ohlin 
theory focuses on the difference in relative factor 
endowments and factor prices between nations as the most 
important determinants of trade on the assumption of 
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equal or similar technology and tastes (Jones, 1979). 
Their hypothesis is expressed in summary form in the 
Heckscher-Ohlin theorem: a country exports those 
commodities produced with relatively large quantities of 
the country’s abundant factor. The theorem rests both 
upon a concept of factor abundance related to pre-trade 
factor-price ratios and special shapes for the production 
functions. Should these strict conditions be modified, 
the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem in some cases no long holds, 
in others becomes meaningless. One of these cases is 
demonstrated by Bhagwati (1972). Bhagwati shows that the 
model is incorrect if factor prices are equalized. 
Leontief Paradox. The first empirical test of the 
Hechscher-Ohlin theory was conducted by Leontief in 1951 
using U.S. data for 1949. Leontief found that U.S. 
import substitutes were about 30 percent more capital 
intensive than U.S. export. Since the U.S. was the most 
captial-abundant nation, this result was the opposite of 
what the Heckscher-Ohlin theory predicted. However, 
subsequent refinements of the test seem to have the 
paradox resolved. In addition, Travis (1964; 1972) has 
claimed that protection can account for the Leontief’s 
paradox. 
Balance of Payments 
A deficit or surplus in a nation’s balance of 
payments may arise for many reasons (Kreinin, 1971). 
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Some short-run or cyclical reasons are: a cyclical 
expansion of national income at home and contraction 
abroad will increase the nation’s import, reduce its 
exports and lead to a deficit; a higher rate of inflation 
at home than abroad will encourage imports and discourage 
exports; a crop failure or strike may have the same 
effect and lead to a deficit; a deficit may also arise 
from international capital flow. Some long-run or 
structural reasons for disequilibria are: a difference in 
the rate of growth at home and abroad; changes in tastes 
or demand preferences; different rate of technological 
progress and changing factor endowments; and changes in 
economic and political framework within trade and 
payments are conducted. Adjustments in the balance of 
payments may be classified as automatic or policy 
(Kreinin 1971) . 
Automatic Adjustment in the Balance of Payments. 
Assuming that the foreign exchange market is stable and 
under a flexible exchange rate system, a deficit in a 
nation’s balance of payments is automatically corrected 
by a depreciation of its currency, while a surplus is 
corrected by an appreciation. In a second case, a change 
in the level of trade affects national income which in 
turn, induce a change in the value of imports and the 
automatic price adjustment mechanisms takes over. 
Adjustment Policies♦ Among the most important 
economic objectives of nations are the maintenance of 
100 
internal and external balance. 
Internal balance refers to domestic full employment 
with price stability. Domestic unemployment can be 
corrected with expenditure-increasing policy, i.e. 
expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. If 
unemployment accompanied by a deficit in the nation’s 
balance of payments, the expansion in national income 
induces a rise in imports and the reduction in interest 
rates may lead to a larger short-term capital outflow or 
reduce inflow, both of which increase the deficit. If 
unemployment is accompanied by a surplus in the nation’s 
balance of payment, reducing unemployment will also 
reduce the surplus. 
External balance refers to equilibrium in the 
nation’s balance of payment. External balance can 
usually be achieved with expenditure-switching policies. 
These refer primarily to devaluation and revaluation. 
Devaluation normally stimulates the nation’s export, 
reduces its imports and improves the nations balance of 
trade and payment. A revaluation refers to the opposite 
and could be used to correct a surplus. 
Protectionism 
Arguments for Protectionism 
There are several noneconomic arguments that might 
make it desirable for a country to trade less and to move 
to a position of greater autarky (Heller, 1973). The 
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more important ones are: the desire to preserve a certain 
way of life; greater self-sufficient as a military 
objective; and protecting the industry against foreign 
competition. Economic arguments for protection are often 
built on the divergence of private and social benefits 
and costs. Schumpeter (1940) in his article "The 
Influence of Protective Tariffs on the Industrial 
Development of the United State", states that 
nothing but confusion and misunderstanding 
can result from any analysis of the effects 
of protective tariffs from purely economic 
consideration and without reference to the 
wider ambitions of the nation concerned and 
to the particular world situation into which 
its lot is cast. (1940, p. 164) 
Schumpeter agrees that the popular arguments for the 
protection measures are "below the old free-trade 
argument" and that "if we lived in a peaceful world, the 
costs of economic independence of this country might 
easily outweigh its advantage." But then, he goes on to 
argue that given the conditions of United States at that 
time, the protectionist policy has not yet outlived its 
usefulness based on the non-economic arguments. 
Generally, restriction of trade can be accomplished 
by either imposing tariffs on imports or requiring the 
exporting nations to impose voluntary export restraint - 
export quotas (Bhagwati, 1983) . In the review of post¬ 
war trade liberalization, Greenaway (1983) has noticed 
that tariff has become less important over the post-war 
period while there is a widespread proliferation of non- 
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tariff intervention - quantitative restriction, 
subsidization and discriminatory administrative proce¬ 
dures . 
Effect of Tariff. Several economic effects of a 
tariff deserve mentioning. It is important to realize 
that the imposition of a tariff on commodities imported 
from abroad will affect not only the economy of the 
country imposing the tariff but will also have profound 
effects on her trading partners (Heller, 1973). Econo¬ 
mists distinguish among the following effects of the 
tariff. First, the consumption will decrease. Second, 
there is a production effect which leads to an expansion 
of the domestic output. Third, there is a revenue effect 
which consists of a change in government receipts 
because of the tariff. Finally, there is a redistribu¬ 
tion effect reflecting the fact that producers now 
receive a price for their commodities that is above their 
increase in production costs. 
Effects of Quotas♦ Most work on import quotas that 
was written before the eighties has been devoted to the 
study of the similarities and differences between tariff 
and quotas. Mintz (1973) and Morkre (1979) have studied 
the issue that whether the effect of quotas is equivalent to 
those of tariffs. Their assumption is that both quotas 
and tariffs will produce an import level which will 
produce an identical discrepancy between foreign and 
domestic prices. Bhagwati (1965; 1968), Rodriguez 
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(1974), Fishelson and Flatters (1975), and Pelcovits 
(1976) have also investigated the issue under alternative 
assumptions. It is only in the early 1980s that authors 
have begun to notice the quality upgrading effect of 
quotas. Falvey (1979), Rodriguez (1979), and Santoni and 
Van Cott (1980) note that quotas have discouraged the 
export of lower value items in the exporting countries 
because the scarcity premium prevailing for all 
restricted items raises the price of lower valued exports 
disproportionately. In countries where the responsi¬ 
bility for administering the quotas is carried out by the 
trade associations, such as Korea and Taiwan, minimum 
unit price was actually set for exports. Occasionally, 
in some categories of exports where the demand is high, 
the application for such exports will be rejected even if 
the prices are above the standard. Reports from the 
Bureau of Census (1970-1981) and the U.S. Department of 
Commerce (1978; 1980) also confirm the upward swing of 
quality in the imports from those countries. 
When imports are restricted by a tariff, the buyer’s 
added expenditure accrues directly to the importing 
government’s treasury which hands back these receipts to 
the public through greater spending or lower taxes. 
Under a voluntary quota system, the receipts from the 
price rise go to the exporters who own the right to 
export (Morkre, 1979). Mintz (1973) and Suh (1981) point 
out that voluntary export restraint provides windfall 
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profits to the firms that own the right to export since 
the ownership of export quotas may be transferred 
privately between firms in most exporting countries. 
The assessing of the costs of quotas are extremely 
difficult because of the absence of available data. 
Mintz (1973) separates the costs into direct and indirect 
costs. The direct costs are: 
1) Production costs - the difference between the 
cost of the domestic, import-replacing output 
and the foreign imports. 
2) Consumption costs - the loss suffered by 
consumers from being obliged to switch the 
purchases to less desirable substitutes because 
of the scarcity of the goods limited by the 
quotas. 
3) Import costs - the costs arise from the raised 
prices of whatever imports are still admitted 
after the quotas are imposed. 
4) Transfer costs - the consumer’s additional 
expenditures on such output as would have been 
produced at home at lower prices without the 
existing quota. 
The indirect costs are those resulting from the 
impairment of competition and the consequent decline in 
efficiency and technological process that are caused by 
the quantitative restriction. 
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Arguments Against Protectionism 
From the viewpoint of the welfare of the world as a 
whole the most popular claim made for tariff protection 
is the so-called infant-industry argument. It asserts 
that the industries that may benefit from large-scale 
operations because of the existence of external economy, 
such as good transport facilities, a well-trained labor 
force, or the "learn by doing” effect, should be allowed 
to grow to the optimum size under a protective tariff. 
Theoretically, this is a valid argument. However, often 
there are difficulties with the practical application of 
this theory (Kreinin, 1971). First, the argument can be 
abused, as it has been at times by declining industries 
that attempt to protect their position in the market and 
thereby perpetuate inefficiency. Second, once it has 
been imposed a tariff is rather difficult to get rid of, 
regardless of the industry’s competitive standing. And 
finally, even in cases where the infant-industry position 
applies, it is more efficient to offer a direct subsidy 
as a means of helping the industry to expand. While the 
tariff imposes on the economy both production and 
consumption costs, a subsidy embodies only production 
costs. 
From the point of view of an individual nation, the 
only rational argument for the tariff is the improvement 
in the term of trade, the "optimum tariff . But this 
applies only to the major importers that are large enough 
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to exercise monopoly power and affect the terms at which 
they trade (Kreinin, 1971). In the very real sense, such 
a tariff must be viewed as a transfer of resources from 
the relatively poor to the very large and wealthy 
nations, a transfer that is undesirable on equity and 
other grounds. Besides, tariff rates in most industrial 
countries probably exceed the optimum level. Thus under 
prevailing circumstances, the loss incurred from the 
optimum volume of trade is higher than gains from the 
improved terms of trade, even in the absence of foreign 
retaliation. 
Tariffs may at times be used to increase employment 
or improvement the balance of payments. But both 
objective can be met more effectively and efficiently by 
other means. There is a perpetual demand for tariffs to 
equalized wage rate among nations. It has been 
demonstrated that American wages are higher because 
productivity is higher than in other countries, and such 
a wage differential is necessary to the existence of two- 
way trade (Bhagwati, 1983). Similarly, the argument that 
a nation needs the tariff in order to have something to 
bargain down in tariff negotiation is economically 
unsound, because the country is better off without the 
tariff regardless of the level of protection it 
encounters in the markets of its trading partners. 
In sum, while tariff protection is very common in 
the todays world, rational justification for its use 
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are few and far between. The world as a whole, as well 
as most individual countries, would be better off if they 
dispensed with it as an instrument of national policy. 
Summary 
To recapitulate, international trade raises the real 
income of the community by improving the efficiency of 
resource utilization. The ranking of industries in the 
order of their comparative advantage, combine with the 
equilibrium exchange rate, determine which commodities 
are to be exported and which are to be imported. The 
resources of a country are most efficiently utilized if 
they are distributed and employed along this order. 
Policies that distort this ranking, such as tariff or 
quotas imposed on specific commodities result in 
inefficient resource allocation and loss of income to the 
community. Even if the non-economic argument for 
protectionism is a sound one, there is a cost associated 
with trade restriction. In summary, we may conclude that 
from the view point of the economists, free-trade will 
increase consumption or the expansion of market while 
trade restriction is costly to individual nation or the 
world economy as a whole. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE U.S.-CANADA TRADE RELATIONSHIP 
Early last year, the U.S. and Canadian government 
agreed to begin the process of negotiating a possible 
free trade agreement covering all commerce between the 
two nations. Both nations seemed to be very enthusiastic 
about the negotiation. Mr. Michael Hart of the Canadian 
Department of External Affairs had expressed in the 
fourth annual workshop on U.S.-Canadian relations that 
the Canadian government was ready for the negotiation any 
time and the U.S. should be ready for an negotiation 
covering all commerce. His exact words are "...the U.S. 
should be going into the negotiation thinking 'big’." 
The situation was quite different on the U.S. side. 
President Reagan had indicated in his summit meeting with 
Prime Minister Mulroney that he would like to complete 
the negotiation by December of 1987. With such time 
constraint, the U.S. was aiming for a progressing 
schedule for the negotiation. Mr. Larry G. Butcher of 
the U.S. Department of State, had indicated at the 
workshop that the U.S. was aiming for different achieve¬ 
ments in different industries. The U.S. would be aiming 
for an across-the-board "free-trade' for manufacturing 
industriesJ some agreement for the agriculture; and some 
beach head agreement for the service industries. Al- 
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though some legal experts doubt that they will be able to 
achieve even this much in their negotiation under such 
time constraint (Koh, 1986), there is no doubt that 
efforts to achieve some agreement will be put in by both 
of the governments in the near future. 
Historical Background 
The Bladen Report 
In the 1950s, the traditionally protected Canadian 
automotive industry suffered increasingly from competi¬ 
tion in the domestic and world markets as a result of the 
development of the European motor industries. Automobile 
and parts production being an important source of income 
and employment, the difficulties of the industry natural¬ 
ly prompted widespread discussion. In August 1960, Dean 
V. W. Bladen was appointed a Royal Commissioner with the 
duty of inquiring into the competitive position and 
prospects of the automobile and automotive parts indus¬ 
tries. His Report, published in April, 1961, had been 
the course of some academic debates. Harry G. Johnson 
(1963) accused him of being a protectionist under the 
disguise of "free-trade". However, in his Report (1961), 
Bladen did point out that the post-war difficulties of 
Canadian industry had to be viewed in a world context. 
He argued that the low volume Canadian automobile 
producer was at a competitive disadvantage compared with 
the high volume producers because of economies of scale. 
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He also favored "free-trade" and rejected increased 
protection by increasing tariffs on the ground that 
"there is a point beyond which the cost of having an 
automobile industry would be so high as to become 
politically intolerable to the consumer" (Report, p48). 
However, contrary to his suggestions, the Canadian 
government had inaugurated a duty-remission program in 
October of 1962 to encourage export of parts and hoped to 
contribute to the efficiency of the Canadian industry by 
making possible longer production runs (Wonnacott and 
Wonnacott, 1967). During the first year of its opera¬ 
tion, Canadian manufacturers were offered duty remission 
on imported automatic transmissions and engine block 
parts on a dollar for dollar basis, for every increase of 
Canadian content in exported parts. The dollar value of 
Canadian exports of automotive parts and vehicles subse¬ 
quently increased over 700 percent between 1962 and 1964 
(MVMA, 1986). 
The U.S. reaction to this program was generally 
negative. A countervailing duty petition, filed by a 
U.S. radiator manufacturer, argued that the duty 
remission constituted a "bounty or grant, direct or 
indirect" under the terms of the Tariffs Act of 1930. 
The Treasury Department chose not to act on the 
complaint, fearing retaliation on Canada s part. As 
additional legal action was initiated and with the 
possibility of "a wasteful contest of strokes and 
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counterstrokes", as described by President Johnson, the 
U.S. and Canadian officials began to design a mechanism 
allowing for the development of a more rational and 
efficient Canadian automotive industry. The result was 
the Automotive Products Trade Agreement of 1965, or 
generally understood as the U.S.-Canadian Auto-pact. 
The Automotive Products Trade Agreement (APTA) 
Since the automotive industry was an extremely 
important sector of both the Canadian and the U.S. 
economies, in the recent years, together with auto-parts 
industry, they made up to about one-third of the trade 
between the two countries; during the negotiation for the 
agreement, the U.S. and Canada had some specific 
objectives in mind. Essentially, both governments 
recognized: 
1) the desirability of establishing stronger 
economic relations with one another; 
2) that this goal could best be accomplished by 
sustained economic growth and the expansion of 
markets available to producers from both 
countries; 
3) that trade expansion is best achieved through 
the reduction or elimination of obstacles to the 
flow of trade; 
4) that the automotive industry has an important 
place in both countries’ economies, hence, it is 
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in the interests of labor, industry and 
consumers to have a more efficient and expanding 
automotive industry. 
Based on the above principles, the APTA sets out the 
three major objectives of the accord in Article I. 
a) The creation of a broader market for automotive 
products within which the full benefits of 
specialization and large-scale production can be 
achieved. 
b) The liberalization of United States and Canada 
automotive trade in respect of tariff barriers 
and other factors tending to impede on a fair 
and equitable basis in the expanding total 
market of the two countries. 
c) The development of conditions in which market 
forces may operate effectively to attain the 
most economic pattern of investment, production 
and trade. 
Article II of the agreement institutes the free 
trade area between the two countries. There are certain 
important exceptions to duty-free APTA status on both 
side. First, certain specialty vehicles, used vehicles, 
tubes, tires and trailers are excluded in the APTA. 
Second, the U.S. requires that articles imported into the 
U.S. from Canada must contain at least 50 percent 
Canadian value-added to qualify for duty-free treatment. 
Of the 50 percent, components originally imported from 
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the U.S. may be included. Finally, Canada confines the 
privilege of duty-free imports to manufacturers as 
defined in Annex A of the agreement. Manufacturers 
entitled to duty-free treatment are producers who 
maintain a certain minimum Canadian value-added and 
Canadian production-to-sales ratio. 
In addition to the above requirements, Canada also 
required each Canadian manufacturer to submit "letters of 
undertaking" concerning its expectations about the 
probable expansion of its production over the subsequent 
four years. In effect, the companies committed themselves 
to increase total Canadian value-added in vehicles and 
original equipment equal to 60 percent of the growth in 
the value of passenger car sales in Canada and 50 percent 
in the case of commercial vehicle. The U.S. government 
was not involved in this exercise but was informed in 
detail as to the essential provisions of the letters. 
These safeguards are considered to be stipulated by the 
Canadian's concern over the trade balance movements and 
the potential migration of Canadian vehicle production. 
The safeguards are considered by the Canadian government 
to be permanent while the U.S. has maintained that they 
are transitional. Over the years, the U.S. has stressed 
that the Canadian restriction is contrary to the original 
goals of the Agreement, particularly "the development of 
conditions in which market forces may operate effectively 
to attain the most economic pattern of investment, 
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production and trade.” Canadian representatives 
maintained that the conditions which originally motivated 
the restrictions still exist. Despite the concerns with 
the safeguards, Canadian manufacturers have had little or 
no difficulty meeting or exceeding their requirements 
under Annex A and the letters of undertaking. Failures 
to meet the requirement of the undertaking are rare and 
since the ability of the Canadian government to enforce 
such requirement is questionable, the requirement has so 
far cause little undue burden on the manufacturers. 
Over the history of the agreement, both sides have 
undertaken efforts to assess its impact. Generally, as 
more than one executive in the industry pointed out, the 
side that is having a payment deficit at the time of 
review usually considers themselves being unfairly 
treated by the Pact. Others, such as Fuss and Waverman 
(1986), argue that given the fast growth of income and 
population and changing demographics of Canada in the 
post 1965 period, the contribution of the Auto Pact is 
really insignificant. However, the most significant 
value of APTA is that it has not been altered or 
fundamentally challenged since its inception in 1964. 
While it may not be an appropriate model for a potential 
comprehensive free-trade agreement between the two 
nations, it does demonstrate the benefits which can be 
enjoyed by both countries through ongoing efforts to 
remove trade barriers and other restrictions to the flow 
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of commerce. 
The MacDonald Commission Report 
The Royal Commission on the Economic Union and 
Development Prospect for Canada was established in fall 
of 1982 and chaired by Donald S. MacDonald. His report, 
which came out in May, 1985, suggested ways for the 
Canadian to deal with "...the increasingly competitive 
international environment and the prospects of more modest 
growth ..." In part II, Chapter 6 of his report, he 
recommended freer trade with the United States. Using 
the example of EEC, he argued that free-trade with the 
United States would secure Canada’s access to a larger 
market, which in turn would cause firms to be more 
willing to make the necessary long-term investments in 
plant, technology, and human resources. 
Pifferent Attitudes Towards Free Trade 
Wonnacott and Wonnacott (1967) argue that free trade 
will lead to rationalization within industry and among 
industries. The first argument is later supported by by 
Coates (1967), Helmers (1967), Gernant (1977), and Flynn 
(1979) based on their studies of the Auto Pact. The 
second argument is derived form the economic theory of 
economy of size. They argue that if a free trade agree¬ 
ment is reached between the U.S. and Canada, some 
industries in Canada will grow because they have not yet 
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reached the economic size while their counterparts in the 
U.S. will not, simply because they have reached the 
economic size before the agreement. For the industries 
that have not reached the economic size in the U.S., 
severe competition will result and some industries in 
Canada will be substituted by imports from the U.S. 
This argument is supported by Williams’ (1978) study on 
the location of industries. 
Wonnacott and Wonnacott’s (1967) argument has been 
generally accepted by industrial leaders and politicians 
alike. Strong opposition against free-trade has been 
organized by industries that are protected by the trade 
barriers. Based on recent reports from the Financial 
Post and the Wall Street Journal, there are mixed feeling 
toward free-trade. Automotive industry in Canada thinks 
that the Auto Pact protects them from the larger competi¬ 
tor from the south and they are strongly against any 
change in the present terms of the Auto Pact. The manu¬ 
facturing industries in Canada are nervous about the 
expected competition while printing, forestry, utility, 
and fishery industries in the U.S. are nervous about 
competition from the north. These industries have joined 
force with politicians who sympathize with their cause 
and created vast resistance to the progress of the free- 
trade negotiations. 
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The Free Trade Agreement 
On October 4, 1987, a free trade agreement between 
the United States and Canada was reached. This agreement 
is subject to confirmation by the legislature of both 
nations. Some of the pertinent terms in the free trade 
agreement are outlined in the following. 
General Terms 
All existing tariff, tariff-related measures, 
quantitative restrictions and other restrictive measures 
between Canada and the United States will be eliminated 
over a ten-year period. There are three different 
schedules for the elimination of trade barriers based on 
different industries. For computers and equipment, some 
unprocessed fish, leather, whiskey, motorcycles, etc, 
tariffs will be eliminated on January 1, 1989. Some 
other sectors such as subway cars, printed matter, 
furniture, hardwood, plywood, and most machinery, tariff 
will be e1iminate in five equal steps starting on January 
1, 1989. All other tariffs will be eliminated in ten 
steps, most starting on January 1, 1989. 
Energy 
Article 902 affirms Canadian and U.S. right and 
obligations under the GATT on trade restrictions in 
energy products. This includes a prohibition on minimum 
export or import price commitments. More particularly, 
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the United States has agreed to eliminate all U.S. 
restrictions on the enrichment of Canadian uranium 
processed before it is exported to the U.S. The United 
States has also agreed to end its total embargo on 
exports of Alaskan crude oil and allow Canadians to 
import up to 50,000 barrels a day. 
The Auto Pact 
Throughout the negotiations, the Canadian government 
indicated that it was satisfied with the Auto Pact but 
was not averse to considering changes that would increase 
production, investment and employment in Canada. The 
resulting agreement leave the free secure access to the 
U.S. market provided by the Auto Pact remains intact. 
The Auto Pact safeguards and the Canadian value-added 
commitments remain in place for the Big Three auto 
manufacturers. 
Section XVII of Annex 301.2 provides that all 
vehicles traded under the Free-Trade Agreement will be 
subject to a special rule of origin. Under the Auto- 
Pact, qualified producers, as long as they meet the 
safeguards, can import vehicles and parts duty-free into 
Canada from anywhere in the world. Fifty percent of the 
direct production costs of any vehicle traded under the 
Free-Trade Agreement, however, will have to be incurred 
in Canada and United States to qualify for duty-free 
treatment. Under the current rule governing exports to 
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the U.S. under the Auto-Pact, overhead and other indirect 
costs are included in the requirement that 50% of the 
invoice price be incurred in Canada or the U.S. The new 
rule is the equivalent of a 70% requirement on the old 
basis. To meet this test, assemblers will have to source 
more parts in North America. 
The two governments also agreed that some of the 
challenges facing the North American auto industry were 
more than a matter of negotiating a Free-Trade Agreement. 
They have, therefore, agreed to establish a select panel 
to advise the two governments on automotive issues. 
The Financial and Service Industries 
In Article 1402, the two governments agree to extend 
the principle of national treatment to the providers of a 
list of commercial services established in Annex 1408. 
With the exception of transportation, basic telecommuni¬ 
cations (such as telephone service), doctors, dentists, 
lawyers, child care and government-provided service 
(health, education and social service) most commercial 
service are covered. This means that Canada and the 
United States have agreed not to discriminate between 
Canadian and American providers of these services. But 
this is not an obligation to harmonize. If Canadians 
choose to treat providers of one service differently than 
the Americans, they are free to do so, as long as it does 
not discriminate between Americans and Canadians. Each 
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government also remains free to choose whether or not to 
regulate and how to regulate. 
In the area of securities, Canadian banks in the 
United States will be able to underwrite and deal in 
securities of Canadian governments and their agents. Up 
until now, because of the 50-year old Glass-Steagal1 Act 
which separates commercial banking from the securities 
business, only dealers unaffiliated with a bank could 
underwrite these securities in the United States. For 
the future, Canadian financial institutions are 
guaranteed by Article 1702, that they will receive the 
same treatment as that accorded United States financial 
institutions with respect to amendments to the Glass- 
Steagall Act. 
Article 1703 exempts U.S. firms and investors from 
some aspects of the federal "10/25" rule such that they 
will be treated the same as Canadian. The rule prevents 
any single non-resident from acquiring more than 10% of 
the shares, and all non-residents from acquiring more 
than 25% of the shares of a federally regulated Canadian- 
controlled financial institution. The 10% limitation on 
any individual shareholder resident or non-resident wil1 
continue to be applied to the larger banks. 
Additionally, U.S. bank subsidiaries in Canada will 
be exempted from the current 16% ceiling on the size of 
the foreign bank sector. 
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Binational Dispute Settlement 
One of the loop holes in international trade agree¬ 
ments is the treatment of antidumping and countervailing 
duty (Dam, 1970). Most of the time, the provision in the 
antidumping clause provides ground for a new surge of 
protectionism (Greenaway, 1983). 
In the Free-Trade Agreement, the two governments 
agree that in order for both sides to take advantage of 
the benefits of the Agreement, there will be need for 
conditions of fair competition to ensure that economic 
actors on both sides of the border have equal access to 
the whole free-trade area established by the Agreement. 
This will be achieved as a result of a three-track set of 
obiigations: 
1) the development over a five to seven-year period 
of mutually advantageous rules governing 
government subsidies and private anti¬ 
competitive pricing practices such as dumping, 
which are now controlled through the unilateral 
application of counter-vailing and antidumping 
duties; 
2) bilateral review of any changes in existing 
countervailing or antidumping laws and 
regulations for consistency with the GATT and the 
object and purpose of the Agreement; and 
3) the replacement of judicial review by domestic 
courts of countervailing and antidumping final 
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orders by a bilateral panel. 
In the past, there were complains that political 
pressures had disposed officials to side with 
complainants. Such complainants will now be able to 
appeal to a bilateral tribunal. Findings by a panel will 
be binding on both governments. Should the panel 
determine that the law has been properly applied, the 
matter is closed. If it finds that the administering 
authority erred on the basis of the same standards as 
would be applied by a domestic court, it can send the 
issue back to the administering authority to correct the 
error and make a new determination. 
Summary of the Free-Trade Agreement 
In general, the Free-Trade Agreement seems to have 
something for everyone. The Canadian government gets the 
trade agreement that it wants. The U.S. government gets 
the access to the service industries in Canada. The 
Canadian auto-industry gets to keep their Auto Pact 
almost intact. What is more, it provides an example in 
the settlement of binational disputes over antidumping 
and countervailing duties. If this works, it will 
provide an example for the future rounds of negotiation 
for GATT. However, all is not settled for the Agreement. 
There is still strong resistance to the confirmation of 
the Agreement in the Houses of both nation. The future 
of the Agreement depends on the debates on Capital Hill 
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and Ottawa. 
Recent Development 
In the April 4, 1988 issue of Business Week, it 
reports that industries are preparing themselves for the 
great North America shakeout. Although the Free Trade 
Agreement has not yet received the final ratification, 
companies on both sides of the border acting as though it 
is already law. They are trying to position themselves 
at the strategically advantageous position for the common 
market. They feel that anyone who waits until the Agree¬ 
ment is signed will be too late. Across the continent, 
American and Canadian workers, unions, and political 
leaders are beginning to fight for the .jobs that stand to 
be destroyed and created as the North American Market 
unfolds. 
124 
CHAPTER V I 
METHODOLOGY 
Conceptual Framework 
Many economists argue that free trade will lead to 
market expansion which in turn results in trade efficien¬ 
cy, production efficiency, and investment efficiency 
(Figure 2). 
FREE 
TRADE 
TRADE 
EFFICIENCY 
(Figure 2) 
The Economists’ Argument 
This study uses this argument to analyze executives’ 
perceptions as to the impacts of freer trade and its 
effects on the implementation of their strategies. 
Perception of executives in the top 300 Canadian manufac¬ 
turing firms as to the effects of freer trade between the 
U.S. and Canada will be sought in an effort to discover 
whether they conform with the economists’ logic. By 
analyzing the variables which are the underlying causes 
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of the efficiencies resulting from market expansion and 
by finding out the effects of such variables on the 
development and implementation of corporate strategies, 
we are able to provide a link between the perception of 
freer trade and its effects on strategies. 
Hypotheses 
The foundation of this study is the role of 
managers' perception on the development and implementa¬ 
tion of their strategies. The theories upon which the 
development of our hypotheses is based are: 
1) the economists’ argument that freer trade will 
lead to an expansion of market which in turn 
will lead to trade efficiency, production 
efficiency, and investment efficiency 
(MacDonald, 1985); 
2) Chandler's (1962) theory that managers use 
different approaches to implement their long 
term corporate strategy by the allocation or 
reallocation of resources — funds, equipment, 
and personnel; and 
3) the studies that managers’ decisions are 
influenced by their perception (Fishbein and 
Ajzen, 1975; Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and 
Theoret, 1976; Mitroff and Emshoff, 1979; 
Cosier, 1981; Duhaime and Schwenk, 1985). 
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Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses have been generated from 
the three management theories mentioned above. 
Hypothesis #1: Executives’ perceptions conform with the 
economists’ arguments in terms of the results of 
freer trade. 
Hypothesis #2: Managers’ decisions in choosing the 
tactics to implement their strategies are influenced 
by their perception of the trade policy. 
Operationalization 
Survey of Executives 
Mail survey is chosen as the means to collect data 
for the study. A list of the presidents of the top 300 
Canadian firms in manufacturing based on their annual 
sales is selected from The Finaneial Post 500 published 
by The Financial Post of Canada in summer of 1987. The 
objectives of this survey are: 
a) to solicit the perceived effects of free trade, or 
the executives’ expectation of the effects if the 
U.S.-Canadian trade negotiation came through with 
a freer trade agreement by the executives 
responses; and 
b) to solicit the perception of any change on the 
executives’ action plan basing on the likelyhood 
of any outcome caused by freer trade. 
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Measurement of constructs 
The variables in the economists’ argument: trade 
efficiency, production efficiency, and investment 
efficiency are unobservable or difficult to measure 
directly, therefore, Linear Structural Relations (LISREL) 
is chosen for the analysis of this model. Structural 
equation models have been useful in attacking many sub¬ 
stantive problems in the social and behavioral sciences. 
Such models have been used in the study of macroeconomic 
policy formation, intergenerational occupational 
mobility, racial discrimination in employment, housing 
and earnings, studies of antecedents and consequences of 
drug use, scholastic achievement and evaluation of social 
action programs and many other areas. The structural 
equation model is used to specify the phenomenon under 
study in terms of putative cause and effect variables and 
their indicators (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1984). According 
to Joreskog and Sorbom, LISREL is a general computer 
program for estimating the unknown coefficients in a set 
of linear structural equations. The variables in the 
equation system may be either directly observed variables 
or unmeasured latent variables (hypothetical construct 
variables) which are not observed but related to observed 
variables. In this case, trade efficiency, production 
efficiency, and investment efficiency are latent 
variables which cannot be measured directly. In LISREL, 
latent variables appear as underlying causes of the 
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observed variables, in this case, the different manifest 
indicators. 
Since the variables are unobservable or latent 
variables, it is unrealistic to expect a single indicator 
to capture validly and reliably such constructs 
(Pedhazur, 1982; Dillon and Goldstein, 1984.) Instead, 
multiple indicators are called for. In our case, besides 
using multiple indicators for the latent constructs, we 
also use multiple measurements. Both a direct measure 
and a indirect measure are used to measure our responses. 
Direct measure. Perception (attitude) is measured 
directly by using Semantic Differential Scale. Osgood, 
Suci, and Tannenbaum (1961) argue that semantic 
differential is a particular kind of measurement 
operation relates to the functioning of representational 
processes in language behavior and hence may serve as an 
index of these processes. The semantic differential is 
essentially a combination of controlled association and 
scaling procedures. We provide the subject with a 
concept to be differentiated (in this case: market 
expansion, trade efficiency, production efficiency, and 
investment efficiency) and a set of bipolar adjectival 
scales against which to do it. The responses of the 
subject provides us with the direction and intensity on 
the scale. Each judgement represents a selection among a 
set of given alternatives and serve to locate the concept 
as a point in the semantic space. This process allows us 
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to allocate a concept to a point in the multidimensional 
semantic space. 
A group of questions in the questionnaire are 
designed to use different sets of bipolar adjectives to 
describe market expansion, trade efficiency, production 
efficiency, and investment efficiency. The adjectives 
are selected from the list of adjectives on Thesaurus 
Study in The Measurement of Meaning (Osgood, Suci, 
Tannenbaum, 1961). 
Indirect measure. Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) assume 
that "man is basically a rational information processor 
whose belief, attitudes, intentions, and behaviors are 
influenced by the information available to him." 
According to Fishbein and Ajzen, attitude (perception) is 
the product of belief and value. Two groups of questions 
in the questionnaire are designed to measure the belief 
and value of a special outcome caused by freer trade. 
The product of these two variables constitute the 
indirect measure of this indicator. 
Measurement of the effects on implementation of 
corporate strategy♦ Five point Likert Scale is used to 
assess the probability of the effects on the implementa¬ 
tion of corporate strategy through perceptions of 
executives studied. This group of questions provide the 
link between the indicators of the latent variables to 
the perceived change caused by such a variable. 
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Model Building 
Causal Model. The concept of causation has stirred 
a great deal of controversy among philosophers and 
scientists (Pedhazur, 1982; Cook and Campbell, 1979; 
Dillon and Goldstein, 1984) . Scientists seem to have a 
need to resort to causal frameworks, even though on 
philosophical grounds they may have reservations about 
the concept of causation (Pedhazur, 1982). Dillon and 
Goldstein (1984) feel that "by adopting a causal orienta¬ 
tion in one’s research, a logical thought process is 
evoked that moves the researcher closer to the kind of 
research found in the pure sciences (p.431).M All these 
authors agree that no statistical methodology is capable, 
by itself, of "proving” cause and effect. The evaluation 
of causal models involves theoretical, methodological, 
and statistical analysis. Pedhazur (1982) conclude that 
the role of theory in the formulation of causal models is 
important. The causes and effects are held together by 
theories. 
... it is one’ causal model about the pattern 
of causation among the variables under study 
that determines, among other things, the type 
of data to be collected and the method by 
which they are to be analyzed. Broadly 
speaking, the analysis of the data is 
designed to shed light on question or whether 
or not the causal model is consistent with 
the data. If the model is inconsistent with 
the data, doubt is cast about the the theory 
that has generated it ... consistency of the 
model with the data, however does not consti¬ 
tute proof of a theory; at best it only lends 
support to it." (Pedhazur 1973, p.578) 
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FREER 
TRADE 
(Figure 3) 
Causal Model 
Based on the economists’ argument a causal model is 
developed (Figure 3). In this causal model freer trade is 
considered as a pre-condition of market expansion and 
trade efficiency, production efficiency, and investment 
efficiency are in turn caused by market expansion. 
LISREL Model♦ LISREL (Linear Structural Relations) 
is a general computer program developed by Joreskog 
(1973) for estimating the causal effects of unknown 
coefficients in a set of linear structural equations. 
The variables in the equation may be directly observed 
variables, unobserved hypothetical construct variables, 
or latent variables which are not observed but are 
related to other observed variables. In the case of 
latent variables, LISREL assumes that there is a causal 
structure among a set of latent variables or hypothetical 
constructs of independent and dependent variables. These 
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latent variables are not directly observed, but there is 
a set of observed variables that are related to the 
latent variables. Thus, the latent variables are 
contrued as underlying causes of the observed variables. 
The LISREL model consists of two parts: the measure¬ 
ment model and the structural equation model. The 
measurement model specifies how the latent variables or 
hypothetical constructs are measured in terms of the 
observed variables and is used to describe the measure¬ 
ment properties of the observed variables, i.e., 
validities and reliabilities. The structural equation 
model specifies the causal relationships among the latent 
variables and is used to describe the causal effects and 
the amount of unexplained variance. The program can 
analyze a wide range of models, for example, exploratory 
and confirmatory factor analysis models, path analysis 
models, path analysis models, econometric model for time 
series data, recursive and non-recursive models for 
cross-sectional and longtitudinal data and covariance 
structure models (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1986). 
Using the causal model, a LISREL model is cons¬ 
tructed (see Figure 4, page 134). The manifest variables 
or indicators of each latent variable are made up of one 
direct measurement and several indirect measurements. 
Pedhazur (1982) quotes Bentler on the following paragraph 
about manifest variables: 
Since the LVs (Latent Variables) are in 
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FREER 
TRADE 
(Figure 4) 
LISREL Model 
practice abstractions that presumably under 
lie MVs (Manifest Variables), a poor choice 
of MVs will create doubt as to whether a 
theory’s constructs are in fact embedded in a 
model. Choosing the right number of indi- 
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cators for each LV is something of an art: in 
principle, the more the better; in practice, 
too many indicators make it difficult if not 
impossible to fit a model to data. (Pedhazur, 
1973, p.641) 
Under such consideration, care has been exercised 
in selecting the indicators. For the direct measurement, 
a list of fifteen pairs of adjectives are chosen from the 
Table 2. List of Manifest Indicators. 
Market Expansion 
XI 
X2 
X3 
X4 
Direct measure of market expansion 
Volume increase caused by a larger combined 
market 
New markets created by lower costs category 
Overall industrial expansion (more compatible 
in third countries) 
Trade Efficiency 
Y1 = Direct measure of trade efficiency 
Y2 = Lower transportation costs 
Y3 = Less paperwork and red-tape 
Y4 = Comparative advantage as a result of speciali¬ 
zation 
Y5 = Greater competition 
Production Efficiency 
Y6 = Direct measure of production efficiency 
Y7 = Less wastage of resources, e.g., raw material, 
labor, and time 
Y8 = Lower production costs 
Y9 = More efficient labor utilization based on 
concentration of production 
Y10 = Better quality products 
Yll = Plant improvement 
Investment Efficiency 
Y12 = Direct measure of investment efficiency 
Y13 = Marginal efficiency of investment (MEI) 
Y14 = More flexibility of capital (cross border 
investment) 
Y15 = Return on assets (as a result of concentration 
in production) 
Y16 = Costs of capital 
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Thesaurus study provided by Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum 
(1961). The indirect measurements are identified by 
interviews conducted with seven executives. 
Executives Interviewed. Two of the interviewees are 
in the position of planning and policy making; three in 
production; and two are director and staff in inter¬ 
national policy issues. Six of the interviews were 
conducted in person and one was conducted over the tele¬ 
phone. All the interviews in person are tape-recorded 
while written notes are taken over the phone-interview. 
During the interviews, the following questions are asked: 
In your opinion, what are market expansion, trade 
efficiency, production efficiency, and investment 
ef ficiency? 
Their responses are analyzed and twenty-three 
variables identified. Based on the result of factor 
analysis (Appendix A), eighteen variables were chosen 
from the initial twenty-three. 
Pre-test. A questionnaire was written by using the 
fifteen pairs of adjectives for direct measurement and 
the eighteen chosen variables for indirect measurement on 
the latent constructs. The same variables are also used 
to solicit the effects on implementation of strategies. 
The resulting questionnaire was used to survey a group of 
sixty-seven MBA students. Their responses are analyzed 
by Factor Analysis on SPSS. The program is used to check 
for factors, factor loadings, and unidimensionality 
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(Appendix A). As a result of their loadings on the 
constructed: nine pairs of adjectives are chosen to test 
Market Expansion; twelve pairs of adjectives are chosen 
to test Trade Efficiency, Production Efficiency, and 
Investment Efficiency. For the indirect measure, based 
on the factor loadings the number of variables are fur¬ 
ther narrowed down to sixteen. Three of these variables 
load on Market Expansion, four on Trade Efficiency, five 
on Production Efficiency, and four on Investment 
Ef ficiency. 
A final questionnaire (Appendix B) is constructed 
using the above chosen adjectives and variables. 
Mail Survey 
A survey was mailed to Canadian executives on the 
6th of July, 1987. A reminder and follow-up was mailed 
on the first week of August. Since the deadline for the 
U.S. and Canadian free trade negotiation was set at 
October 4th, the cut off date for responses was September 
30th . 
Color Code The questionnaire is printed on three 
different colored paper. One color is used for mailings 
to the province of Quebec, another for mailings to the 
province of Ontario, and a third for the mailings to the 
rest of the country. This coding enables the study of 
the differences among the geographic regions if indeed 
any difference existed. 
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CHAPTER VII 
ANALYSIS OF DATA 
General Statistic 
Response Rate 
A total of six questionnaire were returned by the 
post office. These questionnaire were not deliverable 
because of inaccurate addresses or because the persons 
addressed are no longer with the firms. There are a 
total of one hundred and eighteen responses on the 
survey. This gives a response rate of 40.1%. Several of 
the respondents left many of the questions unanswered. 
In order to avoid any bias on the analysis of data, an 
arbitrary cut off point of six or more blanks is used. 
As a result, twelve of the responses were dropped. The 
number of usable responses left is 106, with an adjusted 
response rate of 36.1%. 
Table 3. Questionnaire Responses 
Number of questionnaire mailed 
Number of undeliverables 
Actual sample size 
Number of responses 
Response rate (no. of responses/ 
actual sample size) 
Number of usable responses 
Adjusted response rate (no. of usable 
responses/actual sample size) 
300 
6 
294 
118 
40.1% 
106 
36.1% 
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Background of Those Who Responses 
The last three questions on the questionnaire asked 
the respondents: (1) whether their firm is a subsidiary 
or parent of an U.S. firm; and (2) whether they export to 
the U.S. Response to these questions showed thirty-five 
firms or 29.9% are subsidiaries of U.S. firms, and forty- 
seven firms or 54% export to U.S. The above relation¬ 
ships may affect the value and perception of free trade 
and the perceived effects to their firms. However, the 
relationship of parent firm and subsidiary may not bind 
them to conform to the same strategy, especially when we 
are dealing with international firms, and their 
implication should be treated with care. One example is 
the resistance towards the free-trade negotiation by 
General Motor of Canada as reflected in the recent 
reports in the Financial Post. This position is in 
contrary to that of their parent company, to whom free 
trade is their official objective (MVMA, 1986). 
Responses by Provinces 
From Table 4, the response rate for Quebec is lower 
than the rest of the country. There is no obvious 
Table 4. 
Province: 
Responses by Provinces 
Ontario 
67 
164 
40.9% 
Quebec 
16 
46 
34.8% 
Others 
35 
84 
41.7% 
No. of responses 
Actual sample size 
Response rate 
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explanation for this. One possible explanation may be: 
it is a result of the language barrier. 
The data set is divided into groups by the color- 
code and a t-test is run on all 93 variables to test if 
there is any significant difference in their responses. 
The only significant difference between the responses 
from Quebec and Ontario is on V45, which is their value 
on greater competition. This means that there is no 
difference between the executives from the two provinces 
in regard to their perception of the outcomes of freer 
trade and their strategy in dealing with the different 
outcomes. 
Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis #1: Executives’ perceptions conform with the 
economists’ arguments in terms of the results of 
freer trade. 
Factor Loading 
As was discussed in Chapter IV, LISREL may be used 
for confirmatory factor analysis. By studying the 
measurement model of the LISREL estimates, we will be 
able to confirm the different factors and their loadings. 
Factor loadings are the correlations between the factors 
and the original variables. The factor loadings provide 
an indication of which original variables are correlated 
with each factor and the extend of the correlation. 
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Table 5. Factor Loadings (Standardized). 
Lambda Y: T.E. P.E. I.E. 
Y1 Lower transportation costs .54 0.00 0.00 
Y2 Less paperwork & red-tape .43 0.00 0.00 
Y3 Specialization advantage .61 0.00 0.00 
Y4 Greater competition . 37 0.00 0.00 
Y5 Direct measure for T.E. .84 0.00 0.00 
Y6 Less wastage 0.00 .55 0.00 
Y7 Lower production costs 0.00 .81 0.00 
Y8 Efficient labor utilization 0.00 .83 0.00 
Y9 Better quality product 0.00 .67 0.00 
Y10 Plant improvement 0.00 .78 0.00 
Yll Direct measure of P.E. 0.00 .73 0.00 
Y12 Higher MEI 0.00 0.00 .81 
Y13 Flexibility in capital 0.00 0.00 .75 
Y14 Higher ROA 0.00 0.00 . 68 
Y15 Lower Capital costs 0.00 0.00 . 53 
Y16 Direct measure of I.E. 0.00 0.00 .81 
Lambda X M.E. 
XI Increased demand .70 
X2 New market .52 
X3 Industrial expansion .76 
X4 Direct measure for M.E. .86 
With the exception of Y2 and Y4, we find that 
loadings of the manifest variables on the latent 
constructs are quite high (Table 5). The maximum 
modification index is 4.01 for element (9,1). This 
suggests that variable 9, which is 'better quality 
product’, may be loading on latent variable 1, which is 
'trade efficiency’. Since the recommended minimum 
release level for a variable is a modification index of 
5.00. The release of variable 9 will not justify the one 
degree of freedom which will be lost as the result of 
such an action. Also, such a release may lead to a 
problem in undimensionality (Danes and Mann, 1984). 
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Overall, this confirms our initial assumption that: Y1 to 
Y5 load on 'Trade Efficiency’, Y6 to Yll load on 
'Production Efficiency’, Y12 to Y16 load on 'Investment 
Efficiency’, and XI to X4 load on 'Market Expansion’. In 
another word, the executives in general confirm that the 
variables that we identified are indicators of their 
respective constructs. 
Total effects. 
A total effect of an independent variable on a 
dependent variable is defined as the sum of it direct and 
indirect effect(s). A direct effect is defined as the 
part of its effect that is not mediated, or transmitted, 
by another variable. On the other hand, an indirect 
effect is the part of the effect of the independent 
variable that is mediated, or transmitted, by another 
variable or other variables. 
The total effect of 'Market Expansion’ on 'Trade 
Efficiency’ is 0.81, on 'Production Efficiency’ is 0.60, 
and on 'Investment Efficiency’ is 0.78. 
The coefficients in the Gamma matrix indicate the 
Table 6. Gamma Matrix (Standardized). 
(KSI 1) 
Market Expansion 
(ETA 1) Trade Efficiency 
(ETA 2) Production Efficiency 
(ETA 3) Investment Efficiency 
0.94 
0.63 
0.75 
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effects of the exogenous variables on the endogenous 
variables. The findings on the total effects and the 
Gamma Matrix (Table 6), indicate the existence of strong 
correlations between Market Expansion and the three 
Efficiency constructs. It also indicates that of the 
three relationships, the one between Market Expansion and 
Production Efficiency is the weakest. 
Assessment of fit. 
LISREL provides three measures to assess the overall 
fit of the whole model. One is the overall Chi-Square 
measure and its associated degrees of freedom and 
probability level. The likelihood ratio Chi-Square 
statistic and the corresponding p-value are the result of 
comparing the sample and theoretical covariance. Support 
for the proposed model will be indicated by small Chi- 
Square and large p-values. The other two measures of 
overall fit are the goodness-of-fit index (GFI) and the 
root square residual (RMR). GFI is independent of the 
sample size and relatively robust against departures from 
normality. Unfortunately, its statistical distribution 
is unknown, even under idealized assumption, and there is 
no standard to compare it with. So, it may only be used 
to supplement another goodness of fit indicator. The RMR 
is a measure of the average of the residual variances and 
covariances. 
The reported Chi-Square for our sample of 160 
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degrees of freedom is 369.05 with a probability level of 
0.00. The reported GFI is 0.766 and the RMR is 0.069. 
In most research, a p-value of greater than 0.10 is 
required to indicate support for the proposed model 
(Kida, Smith and Dereshiwsky, 1985). Therefore, our 
proposed model is rejected. 
Measurement Errors. The Chi-Square test for over- 
identified models is not addressed to a test of the model 
but rather to a test of the null hypothesis regarding the 
overidentifying restrictions in the model (Pedhazur, 
1982). Moreover, because the Chi-Square test is 
sensitive to the size of the sample, it follows that 
given a sufficiently large sample, an overidentified 
model may be rejected even when it fits the model well. 
When the sample size is small, one may fail to reject the 
null hypothesis even when the model fits the data poorly. 
In view of the foregoing, Joreskog (1974) has suggested 
that "the values of Chi-Square be interpreted very 
cautiously." Joreskog and Sorbom (1986) also suggest 
that: 
Instead of regarding Chi-Square as a test 
statistic one should regard it as a goodness 
(or badness) of fit measure in the sense that 
large Chi-Square values correspond to bad fit 
and small Chi-Square values to good fit. The 
degrees of freedom serve as a standard by 
which to judge whether Chi-Square is large or 
small." (p. 1.39) 
Relative Chi-Square. Because of these difficulties 
in using the Chi-Square test as a measure of goodness of 
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fit, Wheaton el al. (1977) suggest that the researchers 
should also compute a relative Chi-Square. The Relative 
Chi-Square is computed by dividing the Chi-Square value 
by the degrees of freedom. This statistic takes sample 
size into consideration in assessing goodness of fit. 
They suggest a ratio of approximately five or less "as 
beginning to be reasonable." Carmines and Mclver (1981) 
find that Chi-Square to degrees of freedom ratios in the 
range of 2 to 1 or 3 to 1 are indicative of an acceptable 
fit between the hypothetical model and the sample data. 
The Chi-Square to degrees of freedom ratio for our 
model is 2.31 to 1. Joreskog and Sorbom (1986) suggest 
that in most empirical work, the model is only tentative 
and is only regarded as an approximation to reality. 
From this point of view, we may want to consider that we 
have a reasonable fitted model and that our data 
supported our model. 
Although we have strong correlation between Market 
Expansion and Trade Efficiency, Production Efficiency and 
Investment Efficiency, we may claim causality only if the 
data supports the model. In view of the acceptable 
Relative Chi-Square, fairly high goodness-of-fit index, 
and the strong Gamma coefficients, the probability of the 
existence of such causal relationship is quite high. 
Although we must keep in mind the danger of accepting the 
model while the data acutally does not support it (T>pe 
II error). 
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Warning in the Printout 
The printout issues a warning that Phi (1,1), which 
is the construct for 'Market Expansion’, may not be 
identified. According to Joreskog and Sorbom (1986), 
identifiabi1ity depends on the choice of model and on the 
specification of fixed, constrained and free parameters. 
In this case, it is the result of the choice of model. 
In our model, we have only one construct in the Phi 
matrix which means that the rank of the matrix has to 
equal to zero and our Phi matrix is singular. According 
to Frank Ayres (1962): 
A real symmetric matrix A is positive definite, 
if and only if, there exists a non-singular 
matrix C, such that A = C'C. (p. 134) 
He further defines non-singular matrix as: 
An n-square matrix A is called non-singular if 
its rank r = n, i.e., if the rank of A is not 
equal to zero. Otherwise A is called singular. 
(p. 39) 
A singular matrix will not be positive definite 
which means that it will never be identified. As a 
result, this warning is irrelevant to the analysis of our 
data. 
Hypothesis #2: Managers’ decisions in choosing the tactics 
to implement their strategies are influenced by their 
perception of the trade policy. 
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Perceived Likelihood 
To summarize the findings of responses on the 
perception of the likelihood of free-trade leading to some 
specific outcomes and the perceived effect of such 
specific outcomes on their implementation of strategies, 
responses (1) and (2) on the likert scale are grouped 
together to formulate 'Unlikely* and responses (4) and 
(5) are grouped together to formulate 'Likely* while 
response (3) is treated as neutral. Their result are 
tabulated and shown on Tables 7 and 8. It is obvious 
from Table 7, that the majority of the executives 
Table 7. Perceived Results of Freer Trade. 
The likelihood that freer trade between 
U.S. and Canada will result in the 
following: UNLIKELY LIKELY 
1) Increased demand for products in 
the larger combined market. 14.5% 71.0% 
2) Creating of new market in the 
lower costs category. 13.0% 60.9% 
3) An overall industrial expansion. 7.0% 70.5% 
4) Lowering of transportation costs. 15.7% 58.2% 
5) Less paperwork and red-tapes. 20.0% 53.0% 
6) Advantage due to specialization. 1.7% 88.8% 
7 ) Greater competition. 0.9% 92 . 1% 
8) Less wastage of resources, e.g., 
raw material, labor, and time. 2.6% 78.1% 
9) Lower production costs. 0.9% 89.4% 
10) More efficient labor utilization. 2.7% 8 o . 8% 
11) Better quality products. 6.2% 
61.0% 
12) Plant improvement. 6.0% 86.2% 
13) Higher marginal efficiency of 
investment (MEI). 5.2% 80.9% 
14) More flexibility in capital invest¬ 
ment, e.g., cross border investment. 4.3% 80.2% 
15) Higher return on assets (ROA). 7.0% 
70.4% 
16) Lower costs of capital. 18.3% 
48.7% 
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perceived that the likelihood of freer trade between U.S. 
and Canada will certainly lead to the sixteen outcomes 
(variables) in question. Only questions 4, 5, and 16, 
which are related to: lowering of transportation costs, 
less paperwork and red-tape, and lower costs of capital, 
have a higher 'unlikely’ score than 15% and 'likely’ 
score of lower than 60%. The rest of the responses are 
quite one sided. This means that in the minds of the 
executives surveyed, they firmly believe that free-trade 
will lead to all the outcomes we suggested. 
In reviewing Table 8 (page 149), we will notice 
that the 'unlikely’ scores are much higher, with most of 
the score ranging from 15% to 20%, and most of the 
'likely’ score around the 60% range. One explanation for 
a higher base rate for 'unlikely’ scores is: there are 
some industries which are enjoying free trade or 
conditional free trade status between the two countries 
before the negotiation. Industries such as lumber and 
automotive which have no trade barrier are not likely to 
change their implementation of strategies basing on a 
perception of future free trade agreement. Considering 
the percentage of industries that has no trade barrier 
before the Free-Trade Agreement, the percentage of those 
who perceived that free trade will not change their 
implementation of strategies is actually quite low. If 
we look at the percentages from the other end, the 
percentage of executives who perceived that free trade 
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Table 8. Possible Effect in Implementation of Strategy. 
The likelihood that the following will 
affect the implementation of your 
strategies: i UNLIKELY LIKELY 
1) Increased demand for products 
in the larger combined market. 20.0% 59.1% 
2) Creating of new market in the 
lower costs category. 25.0% 44.6% 
3) An overall industrial expansion. 17.7% 57.5% 
4) Lowering of transportation costs. 17.7% 54.0% 
5) Less paperwork and red-tapes. 28.3% 39.9% 
6) Advantage due to specialization. 15.8% 64.1% 
7) Greater competition. 10.5% 75.4% 
8) Less wastage of resources, e.g., 
raw material, labor, and time. 18.0% 57.6% 
9) Lower production costs. 16.1% 67.0% 
10) More efficient labor utilization. 15.2% 65.2% 
11) Better quality products. 17.7% 61.0% 
12) Plant improvement. 19.8% 61.3% 
13) Higher marginal efficiency of 
investment (MEI). 12.2% 67.8% 
14) More flexibility in capital invest 
ment,e.g., cross border investment . 14.9% 60.5% 
15) Higher return on assets (ROA). 15.5% 6 8.7% 
16) Lower costs of capital. 15.7% 59.1% 
NOTE : The above indicators tends to have no effect on 
industries which are enjoying free trade or 
conditional free trade status before the trade 
negotiation. 
will lead to a change of implementation of strategies 
above 60% and with about 20% of those surveyed expresses 
neutral or no opinion. This indicates that the majority 
of executives perceived that they will change their 
implementation of strategies because of the expected 
Free-Trade Agreement. 
Regression. 
Regression is a general statistical technique 
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through which one can analyze the relationship between a 
dependent or criterion variable and a set of independent 
or predictor variables. It may be viewed either as a 
descriptive tool by which the linear dependence of one 
variable on others is summarized and decomposed, or as an 
inferential tool by which the relationships in the 
population are evaluated from the examination of sample 
data. An application of regression as a descriptive tool 
is the use of regression technique in conjunction with 
causal theory. Here, we must once again emphasize the 
importance of a theory in the analysis of any causal 
model. 
Each variable in Table 8 is regressed against the 
corresponding variable in Table 7. The F-tests on the 
null hypothesis from all the variables related to Invest¬ 
ment Efficiency, i.e., questions 13 through 16, come out 
significantly different at the 0.05 level. This means 
that the null hypothesis is rejected and we cannot 
predict these variables from the corresponding variables 
in Table 6. These results are understandable because 
trade barrier are generally expected to play a minor and 
indirect role in MEI, ROA, capital movement, and costs of 
capital. For the rest of the variables, the null hypo¬ 
thesis is not rejected. This means that the variables 
are highly correlated and we may predict change of 
strategies basing on the perceived outcome of the trade 
negotiation. In another word, we may conclude that most 
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of the outcomes we used in our survey are significant 
cause for a change of implementation of strategies. 
Alternative Models 
Theory Trimming 
The name theory trimming has been given to the 
approach of testing of causal model by deleting path 
coefficients that do not meet the criteria of statistical 
significance and/or meaningfulness from a just identified 
causal model. There are some very strong criticisms of 
the theory trimming approach to the testing of causal 
models. Essentially, the criticism is that this approach 
allows the data to dictate which hypothesis to test, 
which is the opposite of the accepted approach of using 
data to support a theory. However, the use of theory 
trimming is always tempting and both Pedhazur (1982) and 
Dillon and Goldstein (1984) agree that it is a useful 
tool for the exploratory stage of research. Here, we 
will further analyze the data for an attempt to explore 
for possible future studies. 
Factor Analysis on the SPSS program is run on all 
the variables. By studying the resulting factor loadings 
(Table 9), we notice that there are three variables: V8, 
V16, and V17, which are loading quite evenly onto three 
or more factors. These variables are deleted. The next 
thing that we notice is that variables V5 to V9 which are 
supposed to be loading onto Trade Efficiency are actuall> 
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Table 9. Factor Loadings of All Variables. 
Factors I II III IV 
VI Increased demand .57 .23 .08 . 37 
V2 New market .48 .26 . 14 . 13 
V3 Industrial expansion .76 . 16 .01 . 28 
V4 Direct measure for M.E. .74 .11 .38 . 16 
V5 Lower transportation costs .45 . 32 , 14 . 19 
V6 Less paperwork & red-tape .35 .22 . 12 .05 
V7 Specialization advantage .48 . 32 .22 . 10 
V8 Greater competition .26 .27 . 12 . 10 
V9 Direct measure for T.E. .71 . 22 .46 . 18 
V10 Less wastage .33 .44 . 14 .05 
Vll Lower production costs .26 .80 . 16 . 10 
VI 2 Efficient labor utilization .26 . 72 .32 .21 
VI 3 Better quality product . 16 .64 .07 . 40 
VI4 Plant improvement .21 .72 .31 .07 
VI5 Direct measure of P.E. .27 . 38 .72 . 17 
V16 Higher MEI . 34 .40 .40 .38 
VI7 Flexibility in capital . 29 .47 . 25 .45 
VI8 Higher ROA . 38 .25 . 11 .65 
V19 Lower Capital costs . 14 .06 .19 . 77 
V20 Direct measure of I.E. . 30 .36 .74 .28 
loading onto the same construct as Market Expansion. 
This may mean that in the minds of the executives, both 
Trade Efficiency and Market Expansion are actually one 
factor. We will name this factor Market Efficiency. The 
last thing that we notice is that V15 and V20 are not 
loading onto the factor that they are supposed to. 
Instead, they form a new factor which is independent of 
the other two factors. In the semantic space of the 
executives, they may placed the meaning of Production 
Efficiency and Investment Efficiency into a general area 
of 'efficiency’. So, we will called this new factor 
General Efficiency. Now, we have a new model 
(Alternative Model A) which says Freer Trade will lead to 
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Market Efficiency and which, in turn, will lead to 
Production Efficiency, Investment Efficiency, and General 
Efficiency (Figure 5). 
FREER 
TRADE 
(Figure 5) 
Alternative Model A 
If we are willing to give up the direct measures 
provided by the semantic differential scale and use only 
the indirect measurements to test our theory, then the 
General Efficiency factor will not be considered any 
longer. We will have a new model (Alternative Model 
B, page 154) which has only three constructs. This new 
model (Figure 6) says that Freer Trade will lead to 
Market Efficiency, which in turn will lead to Production 
Efficiency and Investment Efficiency. 
The original data set is used to test the new models. 
Unfortunately, the test results are quite similar to our 
original model, which indicates that these model are also 
not strongly supported by the data. As discussed 
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P.E. 
FREER 
TRADE 
M.E. 
I .E. 
Figure 6 
Alternative Model B 
previously in Chapter IV, the analysis of a causal model 
require a theory and specific data collected for the 
testing of the specific theory. New data designed for 
the testing of these models may be necessary for the 
tests to be valid. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION AND INTERPRETATION 
Summary of Previous Chapters 
In Chapter II, we reviewed the literature on 
strategy, implementation and perception. We summarized 
that 1) the formulation and implementation of strategy 
are interdependent of each other and these in turn 
depends on the ability of the managers to effectively 
utilize the different resources that are available; and 
2) the behavior of an individual is affected by their 
perception of their environment. From these summaries, we 
may conclude that the formulation and implementation of 
strategy is affected by the managers’ perception of the 
environment and the resources available to them. 
In Chapter III, we reviewed and compared the presi¬ 
dential system of United States and the parliamentary 
system of Canada. Although there are differences between 
the two systems, both provide multiple access points for 
business to influence government decision making process. 
Since government policies have profound effects on the 
profitability of business firms, managers will be paying 
close attention to the developments of these policies and 
concentrate in influencing the outcomes of such develop¬ 
ments to their own advantage. 
In Chapter IV, we reviewed the economists’ views on 
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free-trade and trade barriers. We summarized that most 
economists agree that free-trade will lead to an expan¬ 
sion of the market and thus, improve trade, production, 
and investment. In Chapter VI, we take a look at the 
trade relationship between Canada and the United States 
with emphasis on the current development of the Free- 
Trade-Agreement. With the setting of this trade rela¬ 
tionship, we develop a method to test our conclusions in 
first two chapters through the economists argument. This 
method is presented in Chapter VII. We analyze and 
evaluate the results of our survey in Chapter VIII. 
Summary of Findings 
Although the LISREL estimates do not strongly 
support the overall fit of our proposed model, it does 
not mean that all is lost. The LISREL program is so 
powerful that even some of the parameters in the model 
are not identified, it will still be able to estimate 
consistently those parameters which are identified. 
Since in our model, the only parameter which is not 
identified is the Phi matrix, the estimates on the other 
parameters should be consistent. There is no question on 
the confirmatory part of our study. We may conclude that 
the executives confirm the relationships between the 
indicators and their respective constructs. They also 
perceived a strong correlation between Market Expansion 
and Trade Efficiency, Production Efficiency, and 
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Investment Efficiency. 
Some doubt is cast on the result of the overall 
goodness-of-fit of the data and our proposed model. 
Since empirical models are, at best, an approximation of 
reality, and based on the acceptable Relative Chi-Square, 
fair Goodness-of-Fit Index, and strong Gamma coeffi¬ 
cients, we may conclude that causal relationship exist 
between Market Expansion and Trade Efficiency, Production 
Efficiency, and Investment Efficiency. This means that 
executives believe that expansion in consumption will 
lead to improvements in trade, production, and invest¬ 
ment. This support our Hypothesis #1, which says 
executives perceptions conform with the economists’ 
argument in terms of the results of freer trade. 
From the direct responses, we find that a majority 
of the executives perceived that freer trade between U.S. 
and Canada will certainly lead to positive results on the 
sixteen selected outcomes which are indicators of demand 
in the market and efficiency in trade, production and 
investment. The percentage of executives who believe 
that such ontcomes will lead to a change of their 
implementation of strategies is approximately 60%. This 
percentage is quite high considering that a high 
percentage of the U.S.—Canadian business is enjoying some 
degree of freedom from trade barriers even before the 
free trade negotiation. 
The results from the regression clearly indicate 
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that the executives belief that most of the perceived 
outcomes of freer trade will cause them to change their 
implementation of strategies while some others may not. 
This provides firm support to our Hypothesis #2, which 
says managers’ decisions in choosing the tactics to 
implement their strategies are influenced by their 
perception of the trade policy. 
Summarizing the above findings, we may conclude that 
the executives perceive freer trade between the United 
States and Canada will lead to an expanion of consump¬ 
tion, which in trun will lead to the improvement of 
efficiency in trade, production, and investment. 
Based on our interviews with the executives and 
remarks written on the questionnaire, the real issue on 
free trade is not how people perceive it but what will 
happen when its agreement has been reached. Based on 
economic theory, in order to take advantage of no trade 
barrier, after the ratification of the Free-Trade 
Agreement, there will be a period of reorganization and 
reconstruction of the economic structure between the two 
countries. During this transition period, some firms are 
going to be hurt and another firm will receive an 
advantage. This is the real concern of the businessmen. 
This may explain why our findings indicate that the 
perception of the outcomes of free trade and the per¬ 
ceived changes in implementation of strategies according 
to these outcomes are similar for all the executives 
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across the country while there is obviously two camps 
involved in the argument for free trade. 
Limitation of the Study 
The economists’ argument is basically quite general. 
Our causal model is only one of the many ways which it 
can be interpreted. This is demonstrated through our 
development of the alternative models. The fact that our 
data support or fail to support the overall goodness-of- 
fit of the model may not be interpreted as a judgement 
for the validity the economists’ argument. Using similar 
constrains of our model, hundreds of models could be 
constructed. The possibility that another set of data 
may fit our model and another model which our data will 
support always exist. 
Our direct measures of the different constructs 
provided by the semantic differential measurement are 
points in the semantic space of our respondents. Besides 
using it to test our model, in our study there is not 
much possible empirical interpretation. 
The indirect measures are carefully chosen variables 
based on our pre-test. The empirical implication of our 
study is limited to the effect of freer trade on these 
variables only. There are certainly many more variables 
or outcomes which are related to the issue of freer trade 
which our study fails to address. 
Last and not least, since we choose the not so 
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strict standard for our comparison of the goodness-of-fit 
for our data and the overall proposed model, we should 
always be aware of the possibility of a Type II error. 
Needs for Future Research 
We have demonstrated that decisions of the presidents 
of large industrial firms in regards to the implementation 
of strategies are related to their perception of the trade 
policy of their countries. Unfortunately, few research 
is conducted on perception in this area at the empirical 
level (Murray and McMillan, 1983). At a time when the 
world economy is moving towards the developing of a 
global structure, further research concerning the 
perception of trade barriers by the executives of large 
firms are badly needed. 
At the moment, although the U.S. and Canadian 
negotiations have reached what might be called a 
tentative free trade agreement, there are still strong 
resistance to its ratification by their governments. Our 
discussion in Chapter III demonstrates that the actions 
of elected officials are influenced by the lobbying 
effort and their perceived well being of the large 
businesses in their constituent. A better understanding 
of how executives perceived the effect of trade barrier 
and its effect on their performance of their job will 
certainly be one step closer to a better relationship 
between business and government and the achievement of an 
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efficient world economy. 
Although the U.S. and Canadian Free-Trade Agreement 
has not yet been ratified, firms on both side of the 
border are already scrambling to position themselves at 
strategically advantageous position. Hints of including 
Mexico into a American Common Market and the remote 
suggestion of bringing Japan into the group, make the 
studies of perception of business executives more acute 
in the near future. 
Although LISREL has its own problem in dealing with 
inexact models, it can still provide a powerful tool for 
the analysis of perceptual studies in strategic 
management. The exploration study in Chapter VII may 
provide a start for further investigations. 
APPENDICES 
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APPENDIX A 
Factor Loading on Pre-Test 
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Factor Loading 1: Direct Measure for Market Expansion 
Factors: I II III IV 
Good-Bad .66 -.29 .33 .01 
Fortunate-Unf ortunate . 66 -.06 -.36 -.14 
Beneficial-Harmful .77 -.29 -.19 -.05 
Rewarding-Punishing .69 -.07 -. 13 . 33 
Meaningful-Meaningless .75 -.08 -.23 . 14 
Valuable-Worthless .80 -.20 .01 . 11 
Important-Unimportant .69 -.44 .28 -.14 
Useful-Useless . 73 -.14 .49 -.05 
Suf ficient-Insuf ficient* -.47 .53 .17 -.21 
Wise-Foolish .74 . 18 . 10 .00 
Critical-Indiscriminate* . 55 . 50 -.02 -.35 
Central-Peripheral* .47 .22 . 10 -. 19 
Active-Passive* .45 -.10 -.11 .00 
Prohibitive-Permissive * .35 .61 .20 . 17 
Impulsive-Deliberate* .38 .50 .06 .39 
* Variables that are dropped. 
Factor Loading 2: Direct Measure f or Trade ' Ef ficiency 
Factores: I II III 
Good-Bad .68 -.46 -.04 
Fortunate-Unf ortunate . 72 . 18 -.21 
Beneficial-Harmful .71 -.36 -.06 
Rewarding-Punishing .72 . 13 -.09 
Meaningful-Meaningless .71 -.09 . 17 
Valuable-Worthless . 7 5 -.44 .08 
Important-Unimportant .69 -.54 .02 
Useful-Useless .69 -.40 .03 
Sufficient-Insufficient* .62 .48 -. 19 
Wise-Foolish .73 .06 -. 15 
Critical-Indiscriminate .64 .40 -.34 
Central-Peripheral .64 . 32 -.05 
Active-Passive .60 . 23 -.03 
Prohibitive-Permissive* .62 .48 .46 
Impulsive-Deliberate* .61 . 25 .48 
* Variables that are dropped. 
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Factor Loading 3: Direct Measure for Production 
Ef ficiency 
Factors: I II 
Good-Bad .63 -.50 
Fortunate-Unfortunate .62 -. 13 
Beneficial-Harmful .70 -.43 
Rewarding-Punishing . 75 -.04 
Meaningful-Meaningless .80 .02 
Valuable-Worthless .82 -.20 
Important-Unimportant .75 -.15 
Useful-Useless .82 -. 19 
Sufficient-Insufficient* .52 .40 
Wise-Foolish .80 -.03 
Critical-Indiscriminate .58 . 15 
Central-Peripheral .61 .26 
Active-Passive .55 .31 
Prohibitive-Permissive* .51 .61 
Impulsive-Deliberate* 
* Variables that are dropped. 
.44 .51 
Factor Loading 4: Direct Measure 
Ef ficiency 
for Investment 
Factors: I II 
Good-Bad .69 -. 16 
Fortunate-Unf ortunate . 82 -. 18 
Beneficial-Harmful . 77 -.38 
Rewarding-Punishing .80 -.25 
Meaningful-Meaningless .84 - . 31 
Valuable-Worthless . 74 -.36 
Important-Unimportant . 76 -.38 
Useful-Useless .82 -.02 
Sufficient-Insufficient* .61 .43 
Wise-Foolish .70 . 17 
Critical-Indiscriminate .64 . 35 
Central-Peripheral .64 . 5 5 
Active-Passive .60 . 27 
Prohibitive-Permissive* .56 .47 
Impulsive-Deliberate* 
* Variables that are dropped. 
.49 .40 
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Factor Loading 5: Indirect Measure for Market Expansion 
Factors: I II 
Belief: Unlikely-Likely 
Increased demand .65 -.26 
New market . 33 -.41 
Industrial expansion .62 -.15 
Value: Bad-Good 
Increased demand .38 .28 
New market .37 . 12 
Industrial expansion .56 .45 
Factor Loading 6: Indirect Measure for Trade Efficiency 
Factors: I II III 
Belief: Unlikely-Likely 
Lower transportation costs . 14 .41 -.02 
Less paperwork & red-tape .45 .37 -.49 
Specialization advantage . 26 .35 .35 
Greater competition .28 .27 -.15 
Value: Bad-Good 
Lower transportation costs . 36 .49 .28 
Less paperwork & red-tape .84 -.25 -. 13 
Specialization advantage .90 -.20 .01 
Greater competition .67 -.25 . 25 
Factor Loading 7: Indirect Measure for Production 
Efficiency 
Factors: I II III IV 
Belief: Unlikely-Likely 
Less wastage . 20 .47 . 14 .21 
Longer production run* .02 . 20 . 11 .69 
Lower production costs .45 .64 -.02 . 13 
Efficient labor utilization .41 . 25 . 20 . 03 
Better quality product . 52 .64 .13 -.32 
Plant improvement . 58 . 50 .02 -. 18 
Better plant location* .43 . 37 .01 -.02 
Value: Bad-Good 
Less wastage .57 - . 33 . 23 .02 
Longer production run* . 53 -. 12 . 12 . 26 
Lower production costs .80 -.37 .24 -.08 
Efficient labor utilization . 79 -.36 . 12 -.03 
Better quality product .77 -.45 . 20 . 00 
Plant improvement .66 -. 12 -.63 . 16 
Better plant location* .62 -.02 -.67 -.03 
* Variables that are dropped. 
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Factor Loading 8: Indirect Measure for Investment 
Efficiency 
Factors: I II III 
Belief: Unlikely-Likely 
Higher MEI .46 .00 -.39 
Flexibility in capital .62 -. 10 .42 
Higher ROA .41 . 18 . 39 
Lower Capital costs .56 .46 -.02 
Value: Bad-Good 
Higher MEI .45 .47 .22 
Flexibility in capital .79 .29 -.45 
Higher ROA .77 -.64 -.06 
Lower Capital costs .61 -.36 . 10 
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APPENDIX B 
Cover Letters and Questionnaire 
Department of Management UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
AT AMHERST 
Scnool of Management 
Amherst. MA 01003 
(413) 549-4930 
June 16 , 1987 
Mr. &Name&, President 
&Company& 
&.Addr lit 
itAddr 2it 
Dear Mr. itLastit, 
We are writing to ask for your assistance in a matter of 
importance to you and other U.S. and Canadian corporate 
executives. 
Currently, the U.S. and Canadian governments are in the process 
of negotiating a new trade agreement. Freer-trade is very much 
in the minds of both negotiating teams. It is quite likely that 
the new agreement will reduce trade barriers. There are argu¬ 
ments both for and against "freer-trade". The purpose of our 
study is to explore your perception on "freer-trade" and its 
possible effects on your corporate strategies. 
We are asking a small, select number of U.S. and Canadian 
chairmen and presidents of major corporations to participate in 
this survey. Your name is among those selected for the study. 
We would be most grateful if you would complete the enclosed 
questionnaire. Since we are using a small, scientifically- 
selected sample, your responses are very important to the 
accuracy and reliability of the survey. 
We want to assure you that all response are totally anonymous. 
They will be used only in combination with the responses from 
your- colleagues throughout the U.S. and Canada. 
Please return the completed questionnaire at your earliest 
convenience in the enclosed reply envelope, 
Thank you very much for your assistance in this important study. 
Sincerely, 
Howard S. Tu 
Research Associate 
Enclosure 
The University of Massachusetts is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution 
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Department of Management UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
AT AMHERST 
School of Management 
Amherst. MA 01003 
(413) 549-4930 
July 31, 1987 
Mr. &PRES&, President 
&COMPANY& 
&ADDR1& 
&ADDR2& 
Canada &.ADDR3&. 
Dear Mr. &NAME&, 
We recently sent you a survey questionnaire and asked your 
assistance in completing and returning it. Due to the limited 
selection of executives participating in this study, your 
individual response is extremely important to assure the accuracy 
and reliability. We are enclosing another questionnaire in case 
the first one is lost in the mail. If you have completed and 
returned the first copy, please disregard this letter. 
We apologize for the imposition and sincerely extend our thanks 
for your cooperation. 
Sincerely, 
Howard S. Tu 
Research Associate 
Enclosure 
The University of Massachusetts is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution 
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AT AMHERST 
INSTITUTE FOR NORTH AMERICAN TRADE AND ECONOMICS 
School of Management 
Amherst, MA 01003 
(413) 549-4930 
U.S.-CANADIAN TRADE NEGOTIATION SURVEY 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to improve our understanding of how executives perceive the U.S.-Canadian trade 
negotiation and the impact on implementation of corporate strategies. 
All individual responses to the questions are completely CONFIDENTIAL and are processed by automated equipment. 
Directions 
Many of the questions in the survey make use of rating scale with five places. You are to make a check mark in the place 
that best describes your opinion. For example, if you are asked to rate “To-day’s weather” on such a scale, the five places 
should be interpreted as follows: 
"To-day’s weather’’ is 
Bad :_:_:_:_:_; Good 
extremely quite neither quite extremely 
In making your rating, please remember the following points: 
1. Be sure to answer all items—please do not omit any. 
2. Never put more than one check mark on a single scale. 
3. Please place your mark in the middle of spaces, not on the boundaries. 
Bad :_: * :_:_r"_: Good 
This Not This 
1. MARKET EXPANSION IS: 
Bad :_:_:_:_:_ 
Unfortunate : : : : :  
Harmful :_:_:_:_:_ 
Punishing : : : : :  
Meaningless :_:_:_:_:_ 
Worthless : : : : :  
Unimportant :_:_:_:_:_ 
Useless : : : : :  
Foolish :_:_:_:_:_ 
2. How likely is it that freer trade between U.S. and Canada will result in the following: 
likely 
likely 
likely 
likely 
likely 
likely 
good 
a) increased demand for products 
in the larger combined market? unlikely : 
b) creating of new markets in the 
lower costs category? unlikely : 
c) an overall industrial expansion? unlikely : 
d) lowering of transportation costs? unlikely : 
e) less paperwork and red-tape? unlikely : 
0 advantage due to specialization? unlikely : 
3. Causing increase in demand in a 
larger combined market is bad : 
Fortunate 
Beneficial 
Rewarding 
Meaningful 
Valuable 
Important 
Useful 
Wise 
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4. Creating new markets in the 
lower cost category is bad good 
5. Causing overall industrial 
industrial expansion is bad 
6. Lowering transportation costs is bad :_:_:_:_:_; good 
7. How likely will the following affect the implementation of your strategies? 
a) Increase in demand for your product, unlikely :_:_:_:_:_: likely 
b) Creating of new markets in 
lower cost categories. unlikely :_:_:_:_:_: likely 
c) An overall industrial expansion. unlikely :_:_:_:_:_: likely 
d) Lower transportation cost. unlikely :_:_:_:_:_: likely 
e) Less paperwork and red-tape. unlikely :_:_:_:_:_: likely 
f) Advantage due to specialization. unlikely :_:_:_:_:_: likely 
8. 
Bad 
Unfortunate 
Harmful 
Punishing 
Meaningless 
Worthless 
Unimportant 
Useless 
Foolish 
Indiscriminate 
Peripheral 
Passive 
TRADE EFFICIENCY lb 
Good 
Fortunate 
Beneficial 
Rewarding 
Meaningful 
Valuable 
Important 
Useful 
Wise 
Critical 
Central 
Active 
9. What is the likelihood of the following occuring due 
a) Greater competition. unlikely 
b) Less wastage of resources, e.g., 
raw material, labor, and time. unlikely 
c) Lower production costs. unlikely 
d) More efficient labor utilization. unlikely 
e) Better quality products. unlikely 
10. Reducing paperwork and red-tape is bad 
11. Gaining advantage of specialization is bad 
12. Greater competition in the market is bad 
to freer trade between U.S. and Canada? 
: _ :  :  :   :  : likely 
: _ :  :   :  :   : likely 
: _ :  :  :  :  : likely 
: _ ;   :  :  :  : likely 
: _ :   :  :  :   : likely 
: _ :  :  :  :  : good 
: _ :   :  :  :   : good 
: _ :   :  :  :   : good 
13. Lessening of wastage in resources, e.g., 
raw material, labor, and time, is bad : - : - : - : — 
14. What is the likelihood that the followings will affect the implementation of your strategies? 
a) Greater competition. unlikely : 
b) Less wastage of resources, eg. 
raw material, labor, and time. unlikely : 
c) Lower production costs. unlikely : 
d) More efficient labor utilization. unlikely : 
e) Better quality products. unlikely : 
good 
likely 
likely 
likely 
likely 
likely 
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15. 
PRODUCTION EFFICIENCY IS: 
Bad 
Unfortunate 
Harmful 
Punishing 
Meaningless 
Worthless 
Unimportant 
Useless 
Foolish 
Indiscriminate 
Peripheral 
Passive 
16. Freer trade between U.S. and Canada will result in: 
a) plant improvement. unlikely 
b) higher marginal efficiency of 
investment (MEI). unlikely 
c) more flexibility in capital investment, 
e.g., cross border investment. unlikely 
d) higher returns on assets (ROA). unlikely 
e) lower costs of capital. unlikely 
17. Lowering of production costs is bad : 
18. More efficient labor utilization is 
19. Improving quality of products are 
20. Plant improvement is 
bad : 
bad : 
bad 
21. How likely will the following change the implementation of your strategies: 
a) plant improvement unlikely 
b) higher marginal efficiency of 
investment (MEI) unlikely 
c) more flexibility in capital investment unlikely 
d) higher return on asssets (ROA) unlikely 
e) lower costs of capital unlikely 
INVESTMENT EFFICIENCY IS: 
Bad :_:-:-:- 
Unfortunate :_.:-:-:  
Harmful : :-: :- 
Punishing :_:-:-:  
Meaningless :_:-— : •- 
Worthless :_'■ :-:  
Unimportant :-:-: '- 
Useless :_'■-:-• -- 
Foolish : :-: '  
Indiscriminate :-:-:-:- 
Peripheral :-:-: :  
Passive :-:-:-:- 
23. Improving marginal efficiency of 
investment (MEI) is bad 
Good 
Fortunate 
Beneficial 
Rewarding 
Meaningful 
Valuable 
Important 
usetul 
Wise 
Critical 
Central 
Active 
Good 
Fortunate 
Beneficial 
Rewarding 
Meaningful 
Valuable 
Important 
Useful 
Wise 
Critical 
Central 
Active 
likely 
likely 
likely 
likely 
likely 
good 
good 
good 
good 
likely 
likely 
likely 
likely 
likely 
good 
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24. Increasing flexibility in investment is bad : ! * ! : : good 
25. Improving return on assets (ROA) is bad : : : good 
26. Lowering of the costs of capital is bad : • : : good 
A subsidiary or division A subsidiary of division 
of a Canadian corporation of a U.S. corporation Neither 
1. Your operation is □ □ □ 
Yes No Not Applicable 
2. If a division or subsidiary of 
a U.S. corporation. Do you 
export to Canada? □ □ □ 
3. If a division or subsidiary of 
a Canadian corporation. Do 
you export to the U.S.? □ □ □ 
Thank you for your time and cooperation. We appreciate your assistance in completing this questionnaire. If you have 
any question regarding the questionnaire, please contact Howard Tu at the following address. 
Department of Management 
School of Management 
University of Massachusetts 
Amherst, MA 01002 
413-549-4930 ext. 318 
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